Popular Culture Review Vol. 14, No. 1, February 2003 | Page 55

The Defining Dinosaur

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picture the world the dinosaurs inhabited when they were alive” {Lives 37-38).
This “worldview” is what Horner calls having a “clear picture” of what one is
looking for {Lives 18).
Although this practice of maintaining a mental image of expectations might
seem to complicate notions of scientific objectivity, Horner is careful to explain
that this mode of vision, while unique and creative, is not the same as the type of
imagination exercised by those in, say, the arts: “Imagination surely plays a crucial
role in my work-helping me fill in gaps, recognize patterns, and make guesses
about where I should look for additional clues— but I differ from the nonscientist
in that I can never stray far or long from the available evidence” {Lives 12). The
important point here is to recall that, first of all, the main criticism of commercial
or amateur collection is that it does not properly process and quantify site “contex
tual” materials, therefore causing the “loss” of scientific value. Secondly, add to
this the claim that such collectors intrinsically lack the ability, the vision, necessary
to perceive this context. The sum of this discursive maneuver is a picture of two
distinct types of individuals, the intrinsically “value realizing” scientist, and the
inherently “value destroying” nonscientist. These two figures are effectively set in
opposition with one another.
The schism of scientist and nonscientist, the distinction between scientific value
and exchange value, and the incompatibility between science and art or popular
culture, all work toward the construction of science as a domain beyond aesthetics
and the marketplace. Once science is textually uncoupled from other more “sub
jective” areas of culture (or, rather, those perceived or constructed as such), the
issues of scientific objectivity and the facticity of scientific objects become less
problematic in their acceptance by the consumers of such representations. Horner’s
discursive constructions of scientific value help to deny the “dinosaur” as either art
or commodity. We should not conclude, however, that Horner’s value concept ap
plies only to fossil exhibits residing in museums. He very clearly states that he
prefers dinosaur “reconstitutions” or life-sized models, and he enthusiastically en
dorses the model-making skills of museum preparator Matt Smith. Smith’s T. rex
“is real” because it “is based on fossil evidence” {Complete rex 97). Evidently,
scientific value can reside “in” a scientific model just as it may dwell “within”
fossil reconstructions.
The collapsing of science into art and art into science, as represented by dino
saur models or “reconstitutions” exhibited in museums, amusement parks, and other
public spaces, seriously undermines attempts to define paleontological science in
an exclusionary manner, while also complicating naive conceptualizations of sci
entific value.^ Aside from the puppeteer-operated robotic dinosaurs fabricated in
Hollywood special effects houses for films such as Jurassic Park, there are robotic
dinosaur recreations produced by companies whose sole purpose is the design.