Policy Agendas in the Media
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State Managers and the Media
In sharp contrast to the almost non-existent pattern of business involvement
in the media, state managers were very active and they clearly dominated the
inform ational flow in the m edia. These state m anagers offered policy
recommendations and they advocated for the support and expansion of their
particular agency’s mission during these broadcasts. Evidence for this assertion
can be found in the analysis of the specific poUcy areas used in this study.
The nineteen state managers could be subdivided into two interrelated groups:
appointed and elected officials. The ten appointed officials included current agency
heads, state managers, and past state employees with significant philosophical and
pohcy advocacy connections to their former agency. Nine politicians were covered
in the media during the week of post-bombing analysis. Five of these politicians
were Washington based and four had direct connections to Oklahoma.
Understanding the interaction between state managers, policy, and the media
is complex. Three specific variables were used to help understand this interaction.
The first variable tracked calls for specific policies to deal with terrorism. During
the coverage week, only seventeen direct calls for specific policies were recorded
from the total pool of on-story speakers. In conjunction with this variable, tracking
of two other variable categories related to state managers, pohcy, and television
coverage are relevant. Specifically, the variables that tracked calls for punishment
and justifications for state violence are associated with audience expectations of
state managers. Sixty-two separate calls for punishm ent and thirty-three
justifications for state violence were recorded. Taken together these variables
supported state manager claims for new policy since they would be seen as
responding to pubhc demands.
State managers were not strictly advocating for pohcy agendas, they quickly
recognized the need to respond to this tragedy. The response by the state took on a
variety of forms, including the locahzation of the crisis, reinforcements of a general
fear of outsiders, and support for the idea that this was a crisis situation.
First, state managers recognized the need for, and responded with, highly visible
efforts to help the local community address the bombing and its effects. On April
19, NBC reporter Brian Wilhams stated that almost immediately after the bombing
Federal agencies “sent elements of the DOJ including the FBI, FEMA, ATF, U.S.
Marshals and Secret Service” (NBC 1995a). Some of these agencies were dispatched
to provide disaster relief and others to aid in the investigation of the crime scene.
This type of supportive response would be typical in the case of a terrorist
attack. In addition to this physical support, state managers suggested that the
preexisting pohcy initiatives before Congress needed enactment to keep such attacks
from happening again. After the bombing Senator Nichols noted that they “are
going to work on some legislation to give additional power, authority” to the FBI