Back to Bazin
17
the medium’s essence lies exactly in its recording capacity” (72). Cinema’s mission
is thus one of “exposing and exploring phenomenal reality” (Bordwell 71).
Remarkably reminiscent of Bazin’s contention is Roland Barthes’ statement in
Camera Lucida that “the photograp h’s essence is to ratify what it represents” (85),
as is his conceptualization of photography as “authentication itself...a certificate
of presence” (87).'^ In his history of the evolution of film stylistics, Bordwell
himself, notably, discards Bazin’s theory: “Bazin’s ontological realism is suspect
as a candidate for film ’s essence: cinema can exist perfectly well without
photography. We have cartoons which are animated drawings, or which are drawn
directly on film, or which are generated on computers” (74). Now, is not this an
incontestable assertion? Let me attempt to specify possible counter-arguments.
First of all, note that Bordwell’s reference in the latter quotation almost
imperceptibly slides from “film” to “cinema.” The former denotes the medium,
the latter - which is far more comprehensive - the institution. While film refers to
the domain of texts and of textuality, the term cinema also includes aspects such as
technology and economics."^ In short, the notion of cinema encompasses the totality
of the artifacts that can be placed within that institutional framework which the
term signifies. Is it outrageous to suggest that not all texts belonging to this institution
- not even all texts we refer to as films - necessarily have to verify the essentially
filmic?
Secondly, the substance of film-as-text should not be confused with the fabric
of the material in which the filmic is deposited, or from which it is being projected.
Hence, the definition of film in the sense I am trying to explore here is not “a thin
flexible strip of plastic or other material coated with light-sensitive emulsion for
exposure in a camera” {New Oxford Dictionary), This means that there is no reason
to put photographically based filmicity and for instance cartoons drawn directly
on film in the same category simply because they share the same physical means
of inscription and projection. If one does, one has mistaken a contingent similarity
for an ontological similarity.
Thirdly, if the differences between photography, animation and computer
generated images are greater than the similarities, would it not be unacceptably
imprecise to maintain that they all manifest the essence or substance of filmicity?
Perhaps relying on the “perceptual-realism” (the phenomenological) argument
referred to earlier, one may of course object that it is in no way established that the
differences outweigh the similarities. The significance of our modes of reception
notwithstanding, in addressing ontological problems I suspect that the cause
represents a more fruitful point of departure than the effect. That is, it appears that
in terms of the nature and process of the artistic composition, animation and
postphotographic practices are more closely related to the media of painting and
drawing than they are to photography. Whereas the spatial entities that constitute