The PKSOI IRP found that a whole-of-Government approach is necessary to achieve US national security goals . Some of the primary frictions to whole-of-government collaboration are the nature of various agencies cultures ; resource , authorities and funding mismatches ; and differing processes , such as timelines and tools . Some key collaboration considerations to overcome these friction points are : clear , achievable purpose and vision shared by all stakeholders ; operational scope is small , focused , discreet , and empowered by the appropriate resources and authorities ; and support emanated from the highest levels and was reflected throughout the Government .
Africa ’ s complex environment is a critical continent in which the US Army must selective engage with partner nations . Even after 10 years of AFRICOM operations , challenges still remain to achieve peacekeeping ( PK ) and stability objectives . Beth Cole , an author and expert on civil-military cooperation , stabilization and countering violent extremism , chaired the second panel on AFRICOM in the LCB . The panel consisted of AMB ( r ) Dan Mozena , Senior Coordinator on Boko Haram for the Department of State ( DoS ), GEN ( r ) David Rodriguez , former commander of AFRICOM , Christopher Runyan , acting Deputy Assistant Administrator of the USAID Bureau for Africa , and Alexis Smallridge , Deputy National Intelligence Officer for West Africa at the National Intelligence Council in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence .
Beth Cole highlighted the importance of interagency cohesion , knitting together the efforts of DoS and DoD in Africa . The first significant collaborative effort occurred when then AFRICOM commander GEN ( r ) Ham assigned a strategic planner to USAID to further synchronize planning efforts . GEN ( r ) Rodriguez continued these efforts by walking lock step with USAID on Boko Haram ( BH ) and the ebola crisis . He afforded the USAID senior development advisor complete access to AFRICOM ’ s senior leadership , and created the innovative Africa strategic dialogue , bringing together senior leaders from across the agencies to discuss collective response to problems on the African continent .
BH was initially composed of robbers and thugs with AK weapons and sandals , but the Nigerian government failure to address political corruption , a common root cause of extremism , fomented BH ’ s transformation into a terrorist organization . BH ’ s power grew in the northeast of Nigeria around Maiduguri by looting banks for money and the military and police for weapons . As BH ’ s activities began to spill over into Cameroon , Chad and Niger , prompting the US with the assistance of the French and Brits , to focus on mitigating BH ’ s strengths , in order to stop BH from further eroding the largest economy in Africa . AMB Mozena was critical in bringing together the regional and interagency partners to ensure all efforts were fully aligned with the DoS vision . The four main efforts were theater security cooperation , engagements , exercises and operations . Nigeria was the biggest impediment to assistance and the root cause for BH growth . Cameroon and Chad units were easy partners based on long standing training relationships with the U . S ., while Niger was a newly formed unit with a U . S Army War College graduate as a commander , which greatly facilitated synchronization of efforts . When BH abducted the Chibok schoolgirls , the U . S . established an interdisciplinary team in the U . S . embassy in Nigeria to coordinate efforts and communication . From an operational standpoint , AFRICOM established a coordination liaison cell in N ' Djamena , Chad , at a French long-term base .
Cameroon , Chad , Niger , Nigeria and the African Union established a Multinational Joint Task Force ( MNJTF ) in the LCB commission to combat BH . The MNJTF focused on intelligence sharing , an essential part of the operational effort . The US worked with two of the MNJTF units to develop their own intelligence , reconnaissance , and surveillance capabilities to build their capacity and synergize efforts . Initially , the MNJTF headquarters consisted of only one military officer . As the mission grew , AFRICOM expanded the communications network and intelligence sharing between all four countries . However , the fight against BH was managed out of the four presidential palaces because the presidents and senior military staffs wanted to remain personally involved in guiding their nations ’ actions . Therefore , the U . S . country teams needed to be intrinsically involved in coalescing the disparate intentions of all four nations . AFRICOM did have BH advise and assist missions at each country ’ s command center . The stratified advising mission elements maintained continuous contact to understand all of the operational initiatives and maintain a common understanding of the BH fight .
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