Disaster Response—a Military Perspective of the March 2011 Mega-Disaster
Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (2004). Since Japan
and the United States do not have an integrated headquarters
like the United States does with Korea and NATO, bilateral
coordination centers at the strategic, operational and tactical
levels were envisioned in the event of regional contingencies.
While not intended for HA/DR, these coordination centers
were set up at JMOD Emergency HQ, USAJ HQ and JTF HQ
approximately three hours after the earthquake.15 It was the
first opportunity to validate the centers in the actual operation.
The organization of these coordination centers, in conjunction
with numerous bilateral exercises and discussions, underscored
the effective partnership of Japanese and American security
forces. Moreover, the rapid mobilization of “forward presence”
U.S. units and the proven Japan-U.S. interoperability undergirded the solid Japanese-U.S. alliance. In June 2011, Japan and
U.S. Ministers for defense and foreign affairs reported to the
Security Consultative Committee that “the close and effective
cooperation between Japan and the United States in response
to the disasters demonstrated the special bond enjoyed by our
two countries. . . . This experience will serve as a model of future
responses to contingencies of all kinds.”16
Lessons Learned
Operations by JSDF and U.S. Forces showcased the effectiveness of the military during a mega-disaster. JSDF assessed that
its first response and activities for victims were sufficient given
the circumstances. Similarly, U.S. Forces assessed that pre-existing infrastructure, robust CENTRIXS network, veteran communicators from all four services, and the early development of
an information standard operating procedures contributed to
the success.17 Nevertheless, JSDF determined there were still
several areas for improvement.18
First is the need for a closer relationship with local authorities.
Significant shortfalls existed in regards to search and rescue, lifesaving, and evacuation because of the huge number of victims
and JSDF unanticipated requirements such as mortuary affairs.
Reinforcements deployed from other regions had to collaborate with communities rapidly in around-the-clock missions.
Clearly, procedures were needed to facilitate cooperation and
coordination.
Second is the need for the integration of joint forces. The JSDF
joint forces were first established in 2006. Consequently, coordination among all headquarters, especially on command and
control as well as air tasking orders, was problematic. On the
other hand, despite deploying half of the JSDF to cope with the
mega-disaster, the remaining joint forces still maintained their
normal defense missions (warning and surveillance, etc).
Third is the need to enhance the Japan-U.S. partnership. Operation TOMODACHI highlighte