Through hard lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD
came to the conclusion that they cannot do stabilization alone.
While the SAR recognizes stabilization as a fundamentally
political endeavor, practical experience demonstrates that DoD
needs legislated authorities for supporting stabilization efforts
in remote or uncertain environments. Lessons learned from the
SAR could apply to NATO, specifically in enhancing Defense
Institution Building capability, and incorporating better man-
agement of NATO’s Civilian and Military interactions, such
that NATO might consider creating or partnering with an
organization similar to USAID.
ly increasing use of internet recruitment. Counter narratives
must be capable of battling terrorist messaging on a rapid basis.
Operation Gallant Phoenix is a shining example of fusing
publicly available information with analysis of captured enemy
material and proprietary information from multiple countries
and international law enforcement agencies to identify poten-
tial terrorist plotting and disseminate that information to local
law enforcement in the target country for interdiction. Several
similar efforts are underway to fuse criminal and national or
military intelligence to counter narcotics and human trafficking
information. Additional initiatives to combat terrorist financ-
ing are also essential.
• NATO’s Strategic Foresight Analysis report provides an
insightful perspective into a confluence of trends that affects all
sectors (political, human, technology, economic resources and
environmental), leading to instability. NATO’s Framework for
Future Alliance Considerations expounds on the nature of war
and strengthens deterrence, defense and projecting stability. In
order to Project Stability, units need to be innovative, credible,
agile and interoperable in applying a comprehensive approach
to crisis management, cooperative security and proactive
activities; working in concert as one partner. The power of
the 29 NATO members’ combined efforts is a very formidable
force that Russia does not desire to engage directly. Getting
consensus across 29 partners requires sharing intelligence across
the EU and NATO. Hybrid threats are the greatest factor in
driving cooperation in order to face these challenges.
• NATO lacks, and urgently needs, the capacity to retain
lessons and track personnel with unique mission experience
in both the security and civilian realm. Institutionalizing the
collection and incorporation of military and civilian lessons
learned ensures mistakes of the past are not repeated. Para-
mount to this would be a database with contact information
for individual experts who have planned and participated in
stabilization activities.
• As the US considers restructuring resources in Africa, coun-
terterrorism efforts should be viewed more broadly as peace
time competition. As the U.S. withdraws from Security Co-
operation partnerships in Africa, the door opens for stronger
investment in the security and economic realm from Russia and
China, which affects U.S. influence in these countries. As ter-
rorism rises in northern African countries, the threat to Europe
increases, thus any changes in the U.S. posture in Africa needs to
be able to mitigate risk in Europe. China is investing heavily in
infrastructure development in Africa, while also increasing pre-
cision strike weapons and tank sales to African nations by 50%,
which is not helpful for a continent that has limited interstate
conflict.
• Hybrid threats are ambiguous, difficult to detect, and deni-
able. Partners must engage on a regular basis to counter hybrid
threats and identify potential weakness, such as cyber defense.
An effective partnership may entail the European Union
focusing on energy security, while the military applies overt
and covert actions. The intelligence community should focus
on attributing hybrid attacks to actors in order to develop an
effective strategic communication program. Russia micro-tar-
gets specific communities and focuses messaging on the corrup-
tion of the government to sow discontent. Training on hybrid
threats, such as media manipulation, needs to be propagated
down to the population, so the community can define their
own strategies for defeating terrorist recruitment efforts. Such
training should incorporate the professionalization of the media
corps, which has weakened over the years, making them suscep-
tible to exploitation and false narratives.
• A comprehensive assessment of a country’s needs is critical
before initiating any strategy development. If partner nation’s
population and its government do not feel they are part of a
solution, then they will not be “wedded to it”, so they must be
intertwined in the design of their own solutions and strategies.
The U.S. and NATO are very good at identifying the positive
aspects of stability efforts, but typically focus on tactical train-
ing and incremental measures. A thorough, brutal assessment
is essential to determine the efficacy of short-term initiatives
aligning with long term strategic objectives. However, if there
remains an ill-defined long-term strategy not aligned with
the partner country’s interest, then assessing the fulfillment of
sustainable end-states becomes impossible. Pre-determined end
states are necessary to ensure a strategy that incorporates mea-
• Non-kinetic defeat mechanisms need a greater role in coun-
tering terrorism, such as preventing terrorist travel, movement
of monies, and internet presence. Strategic communications
and counter narratives should be agile and quick in responding
to recruitment efforts, especially in contesting the dramatical-
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