Many aspects of UN peacekeeping have improved in the last
two decades. Troop contributing countries (TCCs) tend to
place more emphasis on deploying better prepared contingents,
and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has
produced a wealth of guidance and training materials to im-
prove performance. However, much greater progress could be
achieved; for example, training centers based on U.S. military
institutions could provide more realistic training to UN compo-
nents preparing for a mission.
Two fundamental shifts in the strategic approach to peacekeep-
ing should be explored so that missions are better able to dom-
inate the complex circumstances they confront. These include
the authorization of transitional authority missions (sometimes
referred to as an executive mandate) and the complete integra-
tion of UN assets under the mission. Transitional authorities
have been tried in the past with arguably better results than
when they are not established. While some UN literature men-
tions the possibility of a completely integrated mission, like an
executive mandate, it seldom seems to be taken seriously.
Transitional Authority Mandates
Under a transitional authority, the UN or perhaps some other
entity, would be given governance authority and responsibility
until the host state develops the requisite capability. Past exam-
ples included transitional administrations in Cambodia, East
Timor, and Kosovo. After World War II, Germany and Japan in
effect had external transitional authorities for a period. Such a
measure might be suitable in the aftermath of a major conflict,
in case of a “failed state,” or perhaps when a new state is formed.
In theory, a transitional authority would immediately bring a
governance structure staffed with the requisite technical ex-
pertise, which is less susceptible to the power struggles, incom-
petence, and corruption that has plagued the governments of
many countries where UN missions have operated.
An important aspect of such an approach is grooming host state
government officials at the national, provincial, and local levels,
to progressively transition governance functions from exter-
nal actors to host nation officials. Conceivably, a transitional
authority could be established in a troubled part of a country,
rather than an entire state. For example, northern Mali might be
a suitable candidate for such a solution. There are currently no
UN missions with executive mandates; the nearest approxima-
tion is the UN mission in the Central African Republic, which
is mandated “urgent temporary measures” to arrest in some cas-
es. These measures arguably are not very temporary (five years in
existence) and fall far short of the authorities and responsibili-
ties that accompany an executive mandate.
Organizational
Headquarters
SRSG
(HOM)
D/SRSG
PA
Director
Mission Spt
Force
Commander Police
Commissioner
Military
Units Police Assets
SRSG—Special Representative of the Secretary-General
HOM—Head of Mission
D/SRSG/RC/HC—Deputy SRSG / Resident Coordinator
/ Humanitarian Coordinator
D/SRSG/PA—Deputy SRSG for Political Affairs
Civilian
Component
D/SRSG
RC/HC
State /
Province
Coordinators
UN Humanitarian
and Development
Organizations
UN PK Mission
UN Country
Team
Representative UN Peacekeeping Mission Structure
38