My hope is that if U.S. stabilization efforts serve the function of
“building the state” in terms of greater host nation government
effectiveness, then it will help enable the people of that nation
to ultimately come together as a nation.
About the Author: Tamara Fitzgerald, a U.S. Senior Foreign
Service Officer, served as the Department of State Advisor at
the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Insti-
tute (PKSOI) from August 2016 to August 2018. She served
in Afghanistan from mid-2007 to mid-2008, first working as
the governance officer at the Lithuanian-led Provincial Recon-
struction Team (PRT) in Chagcharan, Ghor Province for two
months, then at ISAF HQ in Kabul as the governance point of
contact for the PRTs across Afghanistan.
Notes:
Mason, M. Chris, “Nation Building is an Oxymoron” (Param-
eters) https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/
Spring_2016/10_Mason.pdf, Page 1 (accessed 20 July 2018).
2
Ibid.
3
Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections, and
Media: Unified Action Handbook Series Book Two, JCS, US-
AWC, PKSOI, 19 February 2016, p I-9.
4
Stabilization Assistance Review – A Framework for Maximiz-
ing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize
Conflict-Affected Areas,” page 4. https://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2018/06/283334.htm, accessed 26 July 2018.
5
Young, David H., “Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. Experi-
ence in Afghanistan,” “Strategic Multilayer Assessment Brief-
ing” (PowerPoint), https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/lessonslearned/
SIGAR-18-48-LL.pdf (accessed 31 July 2018).
5
Institute for Economics & Peace. Risk Report 2017: New
Methods to Assess Risk of Conflict and Violence, Sydney,
September 2017. Report number 52. Available from: vision-
ofhumanity.org/reports http://visionofhumanity.org/app/
uploads/2017/09/Risk-Report_Web_Final.pdf, p 4, (accessed 7
August 2018).
1
in developing the Afghan National Police (ANP) over the past
17 years, with uneven results, in a culture that, perhaps similar
to the U.S. in this respect, views policing, justice and rule of law
as primarily a local and communal affair (albeit with markedly
different practices of jurisprudence). In future state-building
situations, should not the USG consider what might be the
most culturally appropriate levels and means to provide both
security and justice?
Research shows that money invested in conflict prevention is 16
times cheaper on average than the cost of containing conflicts
once they have begun, which does not include sparing the cost
of countless human lives lost during conflict. So my supposition
is this: using the premises in the SAR, USG stabilization and
state-building efforts must be concentrated ever more intent-
ly on enabling the capacity for good governance on the part
of host nation officials. That could mean providing building
materials for a few new government office buildings in remote,
restive parts of a country. Howvere, a better approach is deploy-
ing trained U.S. civilians to remote areas to train the local gov-
ernment officials on the specific topics where capacity is lacking,
such as dispute resolution or water management, particularly if
ineffective water management leads to open conflict between
neighboring tribes or neighboring countries.
17