-Have strategic patience; the reason Plan Colombia worked was
the U.S. made small and incremental investments over a long period of time. Success has to be measured in terms of integrated
and holistic measures of effectiveness/measures of performance.
Leaders must be mindful of the fact that success will not happen
overnight.
-Help develop a military justice system; the host nation military
must be able to investigate and adjudicate offenses committed
within their ranks. The PN military members understand that
they are accountable to international law, and understand that
by following international human rights standards, they will
improve their way of life.
-Work to facilitate sound logistics practices, policies, and training, otherwise, PN military might feel pressure to steal from
their military supply distribution chain to sustain themselves.
-Consider changing the moniker “security forces” to “security
services providers,” as this might create a better public perception of the PN military as being force for the protection of their
own people.
-Ensure the generating institutions train the security service
providers to follow the PN law (i.e., constitution, tribal law,
customary law, traditional law etc.)
-Train practitioners and senior policy makers to recognize the
early warning signals of instability. USAID and DoS can help
DoD recognize these early warning signals and their implications. Preventative measure can be taken earlier and at a much
lower cost than total invasion/state take-over. A more formalized interagency communications and network integration is
essential for early warning success. Two examples of such signals
might be the recruitment of foreign security force from one
ethnicity, or an increase in executive powers or protection for
the Prime Minister or President.
-Establish funding transfer authority for U.S. national authorizations and appropriations to ensure the agency carrying out
these SFA-type missions are allocated the appropriate funding
associated with them. In some cases, USAID or DoS might be
better suited for the SFA fund distribution.
-Rebalances national security mission objectives to reflect
a more proactive SFA strategy for PNs with fragile security
institutions in order to prevent the need for those large-scale
interventions, specifically those PNs aligned with our national
security interests; not everything is phase three.
18
Conclusion
History suggests the U.S. might enhance protection of its vital
interests from malign state actors as well as violent extremist
organizations by helping partner nations develop their own
organic security force generating function. Where that is true,
steps can and should be taken to better equip leaders with
improved policy, doctrine, training, education, and experience
to carry out these SFA-type missions. This document contains
some thoughts and recommendation for improving the SFA
generating function. For the full report on the Work Group
findings see, https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Members/Portal/view_insight.aspx?Insight=2791&status=PUBLISHED.