troops and equipment remains in Mali to support MINUSMA’s
operation, as it is beyond their capability to autonomously conduct anti-terrorism operations. Augmentation by French troops
in peace support operation against terrorist groups is crucial for
the implementation of MINUSMA’s multidimensional mandates.
strategic airlift for peacekeepers from African TCCs moving
into Darfur. The air assets transported almost 5,000 troops in
2005.34 The United Kingdom supported the deployment of the
Africa-led international Support Mission to CAR (MISCA)
by providing €2 million to the AU to cover immediate MISCA
shortfalls, including food, fuel and water in 2013.35
In such scenarios, the restoration of peace requires the use of
force, thus increasing the risk that UN forces will become a
warring party instead of a peacekeeping force. While the use
of force is necessary to accomplish the mandates, particularly
protection of civilian, another entity other than the UN must
assume the ‘use of force’ role to discourage the perception of
the UN being seen as a warring party. In Mali, AFISMA and
French troops assumed the use of force role. AMISOM’s use of
force in Somalia, clearly indicates its role as a warring party.32
The UN Mission in Somalia supports AMISOM with logistics and funding. AMISOM’s commitment to anti-terrorism
operation is significant, and would be difficult for the UN to
replace AMISOM with UNPKO forces. Since there is no
cease-fire agreement in Somalia, the belligerent parties continue
to commit atrocities, necessitating a robust, offensive force to
contain extremist’s activities. UNPKO chapter VII authorities
include a mandate for protection of civilian, however, protection of civilian is not synonymous with offensive operations.
The extent of the mandate for the use of force encompasses the
need to create geographical areas that are free from armed attack, secure freedom of movement and access for humanitarian
agencies, and protects camps and safe heavens. These activities
do not embrace direct offensive operation against terrorists. The
current operational environment is unlikely to be conducive
for a political process. This complex political situation does
not encourage the establishment of a UNPKO to assume the
AMISOM mission, particularly with respect to counter-terrorism enforcement operations.
NATO has been supporting AMISOM with strategic airlift
and sealift support since 2007.36 The U.S. provided equipment,
training and logistical support directly to troop contributing
countries participating in the AMISOM mission.37 The EU
supports the running cost of the AMISOM mission. The EU
also provided logistic support and funded €50 million to Mali
through the African Peace Facility (APF) for AFISMA.38 The
combination of F ɕ