11. Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping. Revised edition.
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.
12. J Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl, “The PeacekeepingPeacemaking Dilemma”, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 49,
no. 4, 2005, pp. 621-646.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. The statistical models are based on Table 4 from Greg and
Diehl, “The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma,” pp. 640. We
fit a probit model for both negotiation and mediation success, using the presence of peacekeeping as a predictor and controlling
for the length of the conflict, the issues at stake, the composition
of negotiators/mediators, previous agreements, and a number of
other variables. See Greig and Diehl for additional details. Predicted probabilities are based on the change in likelihood when
peacekeeping does and does not occur, with all other variables
held at their means. We report standard errors in parenthesis.
16. The definition of a civil war differs slightly in these cases.
The data source sets a more inclusive threshold of only 200 battle
deaths, not the typical one thousand. For more detail about case
selection, see Patrick Regan, “Third Party Intervention and the
Duration of Intrastate Conflict”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol.
46, no. 1, 2002, pp. 55-73.
17. Sanctions and other non-intervention options by the international community could be included in this category as well as
inaction.
18. Indeed, this is the most commonly used indicator of peace
operation success; see Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, Evaluating Peace Operations. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010.)
19. Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2008).
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