short . 49 Elections instituted on imposed timelines have been boycotted 50 or backfired , 51 drawing even deeper divisions within already divided societies . Reconstructed governments have failed to match local realities and needs , 52 or been negatively perceived by local populations as “ Western imperialism .” 53 The term state-building has rapidly begun to fade from use , in part because of a recognition that states are hardly as unitary or unified as the term suggests , 54 and partly out of a sense of painfully-earned humility about what interveners can and cannot achieve . 55
Such experience makes it clear that the mere presence of governmental capacity or infrastructure cannot be equated with good governance . Quite the contrary , it can provoke greater instability . Formal state institutions are ultimately also necessary for long-term guidance and maintenance of the critical functions of justice , infrastructure and security . History and experience necessitate a critical re-examination of the governance mission and process in regard to stabilization and reconstruction efforts .
To some degree , this is already underway — the institutional models that defined American entrance into Iraq and Afghanistan have largely fallen . In the meantime , no new institutions have arisen that would entirely replace them , and American interventions in Libya , Yemen , Syria and elsewhere have taken a variety of forms — although too many of the abovementioned features have remained as commonalities . At time of writing this document , the United States finds itself in a gestational period , in which various methods and methodologies are being attempted at an extremely fine-grained level by various offices within
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