First , the addition of phase zero should be included as a notation that post-war may be extremely optimistic and bear little resemblance to conditions on the ground . The nature of reconstruction cannot simply focus on rebuilding broken structures as though they had once been whole , and reconstructing governance is not new , but already familiar if dimly remembered .
Second , the definition of phase zero describes a space and scope of work that otherwise belongs to development and diplomacy . This is emphatically not an argument for turf protection — the training and resources for development and diplomacy are not typically found within the military , and the timing and agenda of rarely match that of military short-term objectives . There is a more fundamental problem : pulling development and diplomacy within the military planning doctrine inherently contradicts the lesson that reconstruction is a civil problem with a military component — not the other way around .
Third , General Garner considered development and diplomacy a foundational part of ORHA ’ s strategy although Iraq reconstruction operations did not map well onto t h e linear Phase approaches . Phase Doctrine suggests : “ Such operations do not develop in a linear way , with neat transition phases , all carefully controlled by some detailed and rigid master campaign plan . They evolve and fluctuate at different levels , in different ways and in different places . In this , a clear visualization of duration , timing and consequences is important in order to allow civil and military decision-makers to shape their environment ; i . e . when to do something , how long to do it for , and what are the desired resultant effects ?
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