FOREWORD
In the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq , the short-lived Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance ( ORHA ) briefly held a mandate to lead post-war reconstruction efforts . The Coalition Provisional Authority ( CPA ) under L . Paul Bremer replaced ORHA before its plans could be implemented . Autopsies of replacing the ORHA and the consequences of the CPA ’ s subsequent handling of the Iraq mission abound , but they focused on the Iraq mission as a historical narrative . However , the United States ( US ) now faces a lengthening list of probable reconstruction and stabilization ( R & S ) missions in the near future . Rather than burying the autopsies , the contrast between ORHA ’ s plans and the CPA ’ s implementation offers instructive lessons for future R & S missions .
Such a study is of paramount importance as the short list of countries likely to need R & S assistance includes Syria , Libya , Yemen , Central African Republic and South Sudan as well as , sadly , Iraq again . Whether or not the US military is deployed to bring an end to the crises , failure to assist in R & S processes following a ceasefire is not an option . The power vacuums that follow crisis are a perfect breeding ground for extremism , transnational crime and recurrent violence , all of which have international , as well as national and regional security ramifications .
This paper presents a framework that planners can use to speed the planning process and improve traction . R & S contexts require the ability to function at a high level within conditions of ambiguity , violence and chaos . Using past lessons as principles rather than fixed points on a checklist speeds implementation and guides efforts from a stronger and more flexible start-
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