The sum total of all of the above is that the aim of all reconstruction is , as has been said in other quarters , the creation of a better state of peace . Military forces do not create peace , but can secure sufficient space for those elements of national power primarily concerned with governance , development and peacebuilding to freely institute their programs and build host nation capacity . Use of military forces to implement development and governance programming in reconstruction environments maybe necessary in some instances , however it should not be assumed to be necessary in every instance . Non-governmental or civil implementers should be preferred wherever possible .
Remember history
In Iraq , the Sunni-Shia divide was critical to account for — and catastrophic in its omission . The analogue in Syria is the Sunni-Alawite divide . Similar to recent Iraqi history , the Alawite minority has been in a position of dominance for many years , protected through systematic threat and occasional brutality towards the Sunni majority — and that was before the current war and atrocities that have gone along with it . Pre-Qaddafi Libya had no real history as a unified country . In Libya , society and governance were rather a constantly negotiated product of tribal leadership with entirely nebulous geographical borders and no unifying identity akin to a Westphalian system . For 42 years that loose network was artificially held together by a strongman who played threats and favors against each other in order to maintain his own power , while remaining fundamentally tribal just below the surface .
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