gain . The threat from these groups would manifest itself in high impact tactics such as car or suicide bombings , sniping , and ‘ hit and run ’ raids . A high level of such attacks will have an adverse impact on the creation of stability , a prerequisite for self-sustaining peace .” 28 The CPA rejected several recommendations for higher troop and resource commitments . It bears repeating that a similar shortfall appears to have been present in Libya following the death of Qaddafi , and plans should be made to ensure it is not repeated in other future contexts .
Security is high on the list of important mundanities ; quite obviously , a breakdown in public security can jeopardize every other goal of reconstruction . It would be dangerous , however , to draw too facile a conclusion that the ends , ways and means of producing short-term security are always in accordance with those of producing a positive , sustainable peace . Quite often these can run at cross-purposes .
Reconstruction is a civil issue with a military component , not a military issue with a civil component .
One of the primary lessons from both Garner and the SIGIR report is accountability and responsibility needed to be worked out before operations began , not afterwards 29 — in Iraq , they never really came together . Both ORHA and the CPA were plagued by turf battles and simple confusion over who was reporting to whom , to what end , and who was supposed to be accountable for what .
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