REACHING OUT
important for India , while Japan and the US are for China . “ Neither of the two countries would benefit from confrontation ,” he adds .
A recent memo written by foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale to cabinet secretary P . K . Sinha reflects this shift in South Block ’ s approach towards Beijing . Advising caution on the Tibet issue , Gokhale has requested the cabinet secretary to ask government functionaries to stay away from a series of public functions planned in the capital to celebrate 60 years of the Dalai Lama ’ s exile in India . The note was clear that at “ this very sensitive time ” in Sino-Indian relations , it was best to avoid issues that can unnecessarily anger China .
The Tibetan government-in-exile has now cancelled two major events in Delhi — an inter-faith prayer meeting at Rajghat on March 31 and a ‘ Thank You India ’ event at the Thyagaraj Sports Complex on April 1 .
PREDICTABLY , Gokhale ’ s pragmatic app roach did not go down well with all sections . The fact that the sensitive memo to the cabinet secretary was lea ked to the press clearly shows the level of disquiet among some government officials . The disappointment is acute among diehard Modi supporters and the hawks in New Delhi ’ s foreign policy establishment . Most of them believed that it was a mix of resolve and tough-minded diplomacy on India ’ s part that resolved the Doklam crisis and hence , infer that the best way to deal with our assertive neighbour was only through a tough response .
Some moderates in the establishment accept the need for a more cautious app roach vis-a-vis China , but question whether India had to bend backwards to appease Beijing ’ s sensitivity , as was done in getting the Tibetans to call off the Rajghat prayer meeting .
As things stand , if at all there are any celebratory functions at the Dalai Lama ’ s headquarters in Dharamshala , they will be at a much lower key than what was planned .
Interestingly , the efficacy of ‘ Tibet ’ as a bargaining tool to deal with China has never quite been explicated by Indian pol icy planners . Yet , some of them continue to entertain hope that — being the host of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan
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China is suspicious of Indian intentions in Tibet . They call the Dalai Lama , whom India gave refuge , ‘ splitist ’.
government-in-exile — the ‘ Tibet card ’, if used effectively , can put Beijing on the back foot .
However , former foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal admits , “ Though the Tibet card has been played from time to time , it is not very clear what we have got in return .” Similar views are expressed by senior fellow at Delhi ’ s Centre for Policy Research , Srinath Raghavan . “ If we can ’ t even poke the Chinese in the eye , what is the point of playing a card that only exposes India ’ s hostile intentions and antagonise China ?” he wonders .
Of course , China ’ s extreme , and relentless , sensitivity to the ‘ Tibet ’ issue ever since its takeover in 1950 is all too well known . And it has always been hypersuspicious of any Indian ‘ design to fom ent trouble ’ there . In fact , Chinese apprehensions about India ’ s role in Tibet , along with the disputed boundary , were the key factors behind the Sino- Indian War in 1962 .
Though with large-scale development , communication and resettlement programmes China has consummate — and globally unchallenged — control over Tibet , the leadership in Beijing bristle with rage at the slightest criticism of its Tibet policy . The Dalai Lama , a revered , spiritual figure in India , is seen more as a political leader and is called a ‘ splitist ’ by Beijing . Much of the tension that crept into Sino-Indian relations last year happened in the wake of India ’ s decision of allowing the Dalai Lama to attend a religious function in Arunachal Pradesh .
For all that , the recent move to re-engage with China emerged out of a mutual recognition for cooperation . Indian officials point out that the desire to make a fresh beginning came from the Chinese side , when two of its senior leaders — state councilor Yang Jeichi and foreign minister Wang Yi visited New Delhi last year and felt the strains of Doklam should be kept aside in favour of better ties . When foreign secretary Gokhale visited Beijing last month , New Delhi made clear its intention to match the Chinese gesture and put bilateral relations back on track .
However , the question remains in Delhi and elsewhere about how China , now under Xi ’ s elevated status , will behave . “ China could turn either way ,” says Mitter , pointing out that economically , its expansion could be genuinely valuable to the wider world , with its commitment to the Paris Climate Agreement . But he also cautions about a probable scenario where China ’ s military strength drives it to restrict access to the Asia Pacific region or into a confrontation with neighbours . “ It ’ s not all about China — the rest of the world needs to be assertive but positive about its goals ,” he adds .
Modi certainly has taken a risk by backing his foreign policy team in this new initiative on China . But , for the current move to work smoothly , a lot will also depend on developments in the neighbourhood . “ A primary requirement is to urgently move away from this zero-sum rivalry where every move by India or China is seen as inimical to the other ,” says Raghavan .
The attempt of the two sides is to rev ive the spirit of the 2015 Joint Statement that spoke of “ respect and sensitivity to each other ’ s concerns , interests and aspirations ”.
How much of this can be translated in real terms will be known after the meeting between Modi and Xi in June . The path they want their countries to tread in the coming days will be crucial for the future of Sino-Indian relations . O
16 OUTLOOK 19 March 2018