However , other countries have not embarked on this path and instead cynically use the sad passions of their peoples for other ends . Far from carrying out a memorial reconciliation with Germany and Russia , Poland recalls the very real suffering it endured , a memory reawakened by the attack against Ukraine . Similarly , at the height of the 2015 crisis , the Greek authorities were quick to evoke the occupation of Greece between 1941 and 1944 , stressing in passing that Germany had not compensated the country for the suffering inflicted .
In Europe , as in the world , the paths of memory are therefore being undermined . The issue is not about the memory that individuals , or even groups , retain of a trying period that left an enduring mark on millions of people and their descendants . Rather , it is about the definition of policies of memory . After the First World War , governments used the memory of the sacrifices borne to challenge the Treaty of Versailles . Germany had never stopped demanding its revision , as the Weimar Republic had done longer before Hitler . Italy had endlessly exploited the theme of a “ mutilated victory ”. Japan , considering itself unjustly wronged , had engaged in nationalist one-upmanship . These trends did not resume after the Second World War for two main reasons . First , the Cold War prompted governments to channel popular resentment . At a time when Moscow was condemning Berlin to a gruelling blockade before building the Wall of Shame , Western Europeans could hardly give free rein to their demands , especially if they were counting on the young Bundeswehr to shoulder a share of their joint defence . Second , this was especially that case since Europe was embarking on the construction of the Common Market and the European Union , which supposed relative moderation in terms of memory . This double constraint does not mean that all the disputes were settled . Thus , the German Democratic Republic denounced the protection that its western neighbour provided to former Nazis and undoubtedly helped to make some embarrassing revelations to embarrass the authorities in Bonn . Yet neither Poland , nor Hungary nor Czechoslovakia could express their pain over the drama of Katyn or the conduct of Soviet troops in 1945 . With the fall of the Berlin Wall on the one hand and the aggression against Ukraine on the other hand , these safeguards have been broken . The memory of the Second World War therefore risks plotting a new course . In view of Vladimir Putin ’ s cynical evocation of the Great Patriotic War and Poland ’ s aggressive tone , we believe that the reconciliation initiated in Western Europe has had its day . Far from being placed at the service of peace , the memory of the Second World War now risks being brandished to justify and legitimise new tensions and even new conflicts : a very discouraging prospect indeed .
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Observing Memories Issue 7