b) Promotion of a teleological-reductionist
link between the experiences of individual citizens
understanding of history, in that the focus on and the official interpretation of political institutions
twentieth-century totalitarianisms is expediting is not sustainable long term. This is what future
a “negative foundation myth” of the EU that political activities at European level cannot avoid
makes European history appear to be essentially a taking into account.
post-1918 phenomenon, hereby neglecting other
epochs and experiences such as colonialism and Assuming that ultimately the objective of European
imperialism. remembrance policies is to create an informed
and resilient historical memory which is also
c) Absence of incentives to critically come to terms
self-critical, turning away from a rigidly defined
with the past at the national level, particularly “remembrance culture” towards a common “culture
in view of the fact that European political of remembering” seems a promising approach.
initiatives so far have not necessarily fostered This would basically involve encouraging European
critical debates on commonly held stereotypes states to become actively committed in “coming
and “sacred cows” of national history, and that to terms with” or rather “reworking” their own
reconciliation work t at the European level is all past: a term better suited to describe an open
too often seen as the task of the “other” rather process of societal and political work on and with
than a shared collective responsibility . rather a final interpretation of the past. While
acknowledging the diversity of individual national
With these dilemmas in mind, what are the prospects histories, the cornerstone for such an endeavour
for constructing future European remembrance could be commonly shared European principles and
policies? universalised practices. In other words, it would be
less about trying to homogenise different collective
Prospects of European
remembrance policies:
from “remembrance
culture” to a “culture of
remembering”
memories than to Europeanise attitudes and
practices in dealing with most diverse pasts. Or to
put it in a nutshell: from content to process.
The common European values such a process could
be built upon would be human dignity, tolerance,
freedom, equality, solidarity and democracy, that
is the existing repertoire of core values that has
emerged as the heart of European integration and
There are clearly limits to how much can be achieved has also found expression in the treaties. In keeping
in any efforts taken to collectivise historical with such values, setting up open discussion forums
memory, particularly in the European context. There and developing a cross-over understanding would
are difficulties inherent in trying to reduce the be at the centre of moving towards a “culture of
plurality of existing remembrance cultures – be they remembering”, thus preparing the ground for
national or regional – to a common denominator. successful bi- and multilateral reconciliation efforts.
Additionally, there is a divergence between reference Such an approach implies rejecting any temptation
points in history such as the Holocaust being to name, blame and shame the “other”, and instead
declared fixed and quasi universal on the one hand, trying to address unpleasant segments of one’s own
the shift in dynamics and priorities of remembrance national histories head on and without reservation.
resulting from the alternation of generations on In this regard, promising steps have already been
the other. What can be said with certainty is that a taken, such as the rise of “politics of regret” within
remembrance culture that is unable to maintain a Europe and beyond, with national political leaders
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