SPORTS
12 Obiter Dicta
The glory past of the Toronto Blue Jays
A look into the Team’s ascension to greatness and its heydays
pa r t fi v e: re aching t he pinn acle
kenneth cheak kwan lam › staff writer
A
f ter Toronto bec a me the first ever
non-U.S.-based team to win the Fall
Classic on 2 4 October 1992, GM Pat
Gillick intended to keep as much of the
team together as possible. Since the Blue Jays’ championship window was still open, it would have been
foolish to dismantle the core when the team was still
very capable of competing for another World Series
title in the next season. Some degree of roster turnover was inevitable given that certain players’ contracts were ending. Not only were players who had
average seasons with expiring contracts primed to
be non-tendered (e.g. Lee) or traded (e.g. Gruber) so
that the club could add to its talent level, but even
good players who were finishing up the last year of
their contracts (e.g. Cone, Key, Henke, Maldonado,
and Winfield) were likely to be cut loose. This is
because it was not feasible for the Blue Jays to bring
them back financially speaking since their salary
demands would have been inflated as a result of
having played for a World Series Championship
team. New pieces (i.e. players who offered similar
skill sets and production levels to those who were
set to depart) would therefore need to be brought in
either internally (in the form of blue-chip prospects
who were ready for prime time) or externally (in the
form of unrestricted free agency). That said, even
though adjustments and fine-tuning were needed,
all hands associated with the franchise had a “win
now” mentally and wanted to keep the gravy train
going on for as long as possible.
By all accounts, Gillick utilized the same strategy from the season before to send the 1993 team,
which posted an equally impressive 95-67 regular season record, to its second consecutive World
Series title. He began by making two major signings on the free agent market. First, he inked former
Oakland Athletics ace Dave Stewart (who had four
consecutive twenty-plus win seasons from 1987
to 1990) to a two-year contract worth $8.5 million on 8 December 1992 to offset, at least partially,
the loss of Cone (who signed with the Kansas City
Royals) and Key (who signed with the New York
Yankees). Gillick then shocked the baseball landscape by signing long-time Mi lwaukee Brewer star
Paul Moiltor to a three-year contract worth $13 million on 7 December 1992 to take over the full-time
designated hitter’s duties previously occupied by fan
favourite Dave Winfield (who eventually signed with
the Minnesota Twins). While Stewart was no longer
as dominant as his earlier days in Oakland, he was
nevertheless a steady contributor as he won twelve
games in twenty-six starts during the regular season
for Toronto. As for Molitor, he was instrumental in
helping the Blue Jays win their second World Series
title in as many years, hitting an impressive .341
batting average, along with twenty-two home runs
and 111 runs batted in during the regular season.
Gillick shrewdly filled the remaining holes as
the season progressed. This was a brilliant game
plan because the club was still competitive enough
to be viable postseason contenders on the strength
of its core players, even though it had weaknesses
in certain areas, especially at shortstop (given that
ê The iconic words of the late Tom Cheek (“Touch ‘em all Joe, you’ll never hit a bigger home run in your life!”) reso-
nated across Canada after Joe Carter belted his 1993 World Series-clinching three-run homer. Photo Credit: i2.cdn.
turner.com
Lee signed with the Texas Rangers and his supposed
replacement Dick Schofield played rather poorly as
he batted .191—under the Mendoza line—in thirtysix games before
suffering a broken
arm) and at left
field (seeing that
Maldonado had
signed with the
Chicago Cubs).
Moreover, sealing these leakages later in the
season with rental players would save money for the
Blue Jays (as their salary would be prorated) not to
mention that the acquisition costs would be lower
(usually in the form of prospects and cash) and far
more manageable (without having to mortgage the
entire farm system). Gillick finally pulled the trigger by first repatriating shortstop Fernández on
11 June 1993 (from the New York Mets for Darrin
Jackson) and then shortly afterwards pulled a rabbit
out of the hat by acquiring all-time stolen base
leader Rickey Henderson on 31 July 1993 (from the
Athletics for pitching prospect Steve Karsay and a
player to be named later, who turned out to be right
field prospect José Herrera). These two mid-season
moves solidified the holes at shortstop and left field
created by the free agency departures of Lee and
Maldonado. While Henderson did not perform as
well as expected, as he only hit a mere .215 for the
rest of the regular reason at the top of the batting
order, he still put tremendous pressure on opposing pitchers due to his unmatched speed and basestealing ability. The fact that Fernández had a stellar
showing in the 1993 World Series (a record nine runs
batted in for shortstops) after being reacquired was
an added bonus.
As for the vacancies at closer (created by Henke’s
free agency departure to Texas) and third base (created by Gruber’s trade to the California Angels for
utility infielder
Luis Sojo on 8
December 1992),
the strong depth
of Toronto’s farm
system provided
the necessar y
internal solutions to keep the puzzle intact. Ward,
who had served as Henke’s setup man from 1988 to
1992 despite effectively having dominant closer stuff
himself throughout these years, naturally took over
the closer role and established a club record with
forty-five saves in the regular season before racking up another four saves and a win in the playoffs.
Promising right handed relief pitcher Mike Timlin
(who recorded the final out with Carter in the 1992
World Series) admirably stepped into the setup man
role (vacated by Ward’s promotion to the closer
role). The emergence of Ed Sprague (who sparked a
come-from-behind victory by hitting a game-winning two-run homer off Atlanta Braves Closer Jeff
Reardon in the ninth inning of Game 2 of the 1992
World Series to shift the momentum of the series
in favour of the Blue Jays) as a regular third baseman not only made up for Gruber’s offensive output
(Sprague batted a decent .260 with twelve homers
and seventy-three runs batted in over 150 regular
season games) but arguably provided the Blue Jays
with an upgrade at the position. Also, Sprague’s
defense was superior at the corner since Gruber’s
“. . . all hands associated with
the franchise had a ‘win now’
mentality . . .”
» see blue jays, page 19