O Golpe – Brics, Dólar e Petróleo Euclides_Mance_O_Golpe_Brics_Dolar_e_Petroleo | Page 365

NOTAS E CITAÇÕES NOS IDIOMAS ORIGINAIS
doubts over the legality of such a provision. “The Brazilian government will have
to fight this out in the courts or change the shareholder composition of Petrobras
to give the government a greater share,” she explained. In spite of that possibility,
Pradal did not believe non-operating partner status would necessarily be bad for
Chevron. She stated, “We are trying to maintain a lower profile nowadays,” adding,
“We are a already partnering with Petrobras on five projects here.”
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Although industry is opposed to the likely shift from concession to produc-
tion sharing contracts (PSCs) under the new regime, PSC provisions could poten-
tially carry fiscally advantageous terms for investors. IBP’s Teixeira and Chevron’s
Pradal praised the concession model under the existing regime, calling it “strong
and stable.” Pradal said the shift from such a model to a PSC was a political move,
explaining “Everything the Brazilian government is trying to get from a PSC, they
could have done through concessions.”
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AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES: ‘WE WILL STAY’. Although Rio de Janei-
ro-based representatives of Chevron and Exxon Mobile are bracing for a far more
challenging operating environment, both companies will maintain an active pres-
ence in Brazil, regardless of the changes the new reform package brings. Accord-
ing to Exxon Mobile’s Lacerda, the Brazilian market remains attractive, especially
considering declining access to reserves, world wide. Chevron’s Padral conceded
her company will be “struggling” in the coming years, but said existing investments
and her company’s long-term goals here will keep Chevron engaged. “The rules can
always improve later on,” she said. Both Lacerda and Padral stated their companies
were accustomed to PSCs world-wide and would enter into them here, given compet-
itive and transparent terms.
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The great democratic revolution that has swept the globe over the past few
years has been a triumph of overt action. The CIA old boys spent a generation fanta-
sizing about this sort of global anti-communist putsch. But when it finally happened,
it was in the open. There were no secret paramilitary armies, and there was almost no
bloodshed. The key operatives in the conspiracy turned out to be telephones, televi-
sions and fax machines.
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Preparing the ground for last month’s triumph of overt action was a network
of overt operatives who during the last 10 years have quietly been changing the rules
of international politics. They have been doing in public what the CIA used to do in
private -- providing money and moral support for pro-democracy groups, training
resistance fighters, working to subvert communist rule. And, in contrast to many of
the CIA’s superannuated Cold Warriors, who tended to get tangled in their webs of
secrecy, these overt operatives have been immensely successful.
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There’s an obvious lesson here for [...] whoever ends up heading the CIA. The
old concept of covert action, which has gotten the agency into such trouble during
the past 40 years, may be obsolete. Nowadays, sensible activities to support Ameri-
ca’s friends abroad (or undermine its enemies) are probably best done openly. T