Legal Corner
Reasonable grounds
The
complexity
of mental
health
legislation.
By Scott
Trueman
A
ustralia is a signatory to a number of
international agreements on human
rights. The most important in
relation to mental health patients is the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Article 14.1 says:
State parties (including Australia) shall
ensure that persons with disabilities
(including mental health), are treated and
respected on an equal basis with others:
(a) [to] enjoy the right to liberty and
security of person, and;
(b) are not deprived of their liberty
unlawfully or arbitrarily, and that any
deprivation of liberty is in conformity
with the law, and that the existence
of a disability shall in no case justify a
deprivation of liberty.
This international obligation is reflected
in Australia’s numerous state and territory
mental health acts (MHAs).
This article canvasses one section
reflected in each of the MHAs designed to
protect patients from arbitrary involuntary
detention and safeguard their liberty,
particularly from police intervention.
The sections in question relate to the
requirement that, on reasonable grounds,
a patient who is suffering from a mental
illness (no matter the various definitions of
the same) and are a danger to themselves
or others, can be detained so as to be
conveyed to ensure that a mental state
examination can be undertaken.
Parliament’s insertion of the word
‘reasonable’ is deliberate. It means that a
police officer’s belief must be more than a
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suspicion, ‘gut feeling’ or ‘unconsidered and/
or unmeasured’ belief. It must be objectively
reasonable in the circumstances.
Consequently, the belief must be
objectively assessed against a ‘like’
reasonably prudent officer in the same
circumstances. Note, it is not a subjective
assessment (it is objective). It does not
require an isolated and sole assessment of
the reasonableness/prudence of the officer’s
actual belief. This necessarily requires a
higher evidentiary standard or inquiry to
substantiate the formation of a reasonable
belief before a MHA ‘triggers’ or invokes
the involuntarily detention (for assessment
purposes) of a person. However, two cases
illustrate that, in such circumstances, people
have taken their own lives.
A recent Coroner’s Court hearing is
illustrative. The deceased (BC) had a long
history of drug-induced schizophrenia and
was 39 years old when he hanged himself.
On the night of BC’s death, he visited a
neighbour (for money and a cigarette) and
got into an altercation, which resulted in BC
throwing an object through the neighbour’s
window and wielding a knife in a threatening
manner. The neighbour called the police.
The attending officer understood that,
under the MHA, for him to take a person to
hospital involuntarily (for a mental health
assessment and/or treatment), he had to
reasonably suspect the person had a mental
illness and was a danger to themselves,
others or property. Accordingly, the officer
did not detain BC but took him with consent
back to the station for questioning.
BC was calm and did not display any
abnormal behaviour (to the required level
under the MHA) at the neighbour’s house, in
the police car, or during questioning at the
station. During questioning, BC disclosed his
diagnosis and that he was under a CTO. He
also said his family owned Toyota Australia
and that there was a conspiracy against him.
BC was charged with criminal damage
and driven home. During that trip, he was
polite, attentive but slightly withdrawn. The
officer waited in front of BC’s house to make
sure the inside light was turned on. While
BC’s behaviour was not ‘normal’, but odd
and withdrawn at times, it was not at a level
to involuntarily detain him under the MHA.
Later that night, BC hanged himself.
A High Court of Australia case (David
Stuart & Anor v Tania Kirkland-Veenstra
& Anor) is a further illustration. At about
5.40am, two police officers observed Mr V
in his car at a secluded beachside carpark.
There was a hose leading from the exhaust
into the car, but the engine was not running.
The officers spoke with Mr V, who said he
had thought about doing something stupid
but had changed his mind. The officers
offered to contact various people, including
his wife and a doctor, but Mr V said he would
go home and talk to his wife. The officers
considered Mr V was rational, cooperative
and showed no sign of mental illness. They
allowed him to leave.
Later that day, Mr V took his own life at
home by securing a hose to the exhaust of
his car and starting the engine.
Mr V’s wife sued the police, arguing that
her husband should have been detained
pursuant to the relevant MHA.
Her claim was dismissed. The judgment
stated the MHA was not designed to prevent
suicide but to address the protection of
mentally ill persons. It would be wrong to
assume that all persons who attempted
suicide were mentally ill; the MHA contained
no such assumption.
The justices considered the fact that the
police officers had not formed the view that
Mr V was mentally ill to be critical. Unless
they had formed that opinion, they were
not permitted to apprehend him pursuant
to the MHA. They did not have that power.
As there were no reasonable grounds to
form a relevant belief (of a mental illness),
the control of the risk of the harm to himself
remained with Mr V.
This article is not advocating that there
should be a lower threshold in relation to
the detention of people under the MHA.
The cases illustrate that the legislation is
abundantly clear, that a person should
always be cared for in the least restrictive
manner; this is an over-riding consideration
for the courts. Secondly, the non-detention
of a person does not ipso facto prove (to the
requisite legal proof), that such a decision
(not to detain) materially resulted (and by
itself) in the person successfully taking their
life. After all, the police could detain the
person and they could suicide after their
subsequent discharge. ■