WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION CONTINUED FROM PAGE 49
apply the same protocols to first responders as they do for all other
workmen’s compensation cases.
Department of Labor and Workplace Development: A spokes-
person for the NJDOL, which employs the workmen’s compensa-
tion judges, was quoted in July 2017 in the news media as follows:
“These types of cases are much more complicated than your typi-
cal workplace accident. They are fact-sensitive, and the petitioner
has a very difficult burden proving the employer is responsible.”
This statement was made by someone who, although having re-
sponsibility, had little or no knowledge of the law or the legislative
intent thereof.
Insurance industry: A joint insurance fund (JIF) representative
has written similar language in explaining the JIF’s position to a
local newspaper in early August 2017. Claimants/petitioners “may
not fully understand the law with respect to compensability of
heart attacks and the ‘line of duty death’ doctrine. In order for a
heart attack to be compensable, the claimant must prove that the
injury or death was produced by a work effort or strain involving
a substantial condition, event or happening in excess of the wear
and tear of the claimant’s daily living.” Again, the JIF spokesperson
is apparently unaware of legislative intent.
The JIF spokesperson went on to write: “A first responder who
suffers a heart attack while in the line of duty is entitled to a ‘pre-
sumption’ that the heart attack was caused by the emergency ser-
vices being provided. However, this doctrine only applies when the
injury or death occurs while the individual is responding, under
orders from a competent authority, to a law enforcement, public
safety or medical emergency. The doctrine does not apply when
the heart attack occurs when the emergency service provider re-
sponds on his own.”
That does paraphrase what the law reads; however, it was writ-
ten in 1987, before the dramatic improvements in information and
communications technology, not to mention changes in emergen-
cy operations in the era of duty to act, increased responsibilities
in pre-hospital care, innovations in firematics and so on. The law
needs to be amended to permit coverage for responses under the
contemporary National Incident Management System (NIMS).
In fact, even a rookie first responder (a term not readily in use in
1987) may be an incident commander, thus a “competent authori-
ty” unto him or herself.
An example would be a firefighter who comes upon a fire, enters
the scene, rescues people and then goes into cardiac arrest. The JIF
would argue against compensation due to the firefighter not hav-
ing received “orders from a competent authority.” The JIF may also
argue against a law enforcement officer for taking spontaneous ac-
tion to apprehend a criminal despite a duty to act.
Workmen’s compensation courts: Unfortunately, feedback
from workmen’s compensation courts indicates a propensity to
prejudge cases base