My New Black Magazine - NYU Black Renaissance Noire BRN-FALL-206 ISSUE RELEASE | Page 193

L
————————————————
Q20) 1993

L
————————————————
Q21) 1993

192

[June 12 and the Caliphate agenda]
What General Babangida did
in preparation for the June 12
election was vehemently opposed
by the former Sultan of Sokoto,
Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki, on behalf
of the Northern leadership
because the North was not able to
determine its outcome in favour of
the North. Alhaji Ibrahim tried to
prevail on the President to cancel
the Presidential election as early as
May 19, 1993 because the plan was
seen as capable of reversing the
British design….(pp.302-303)
In fact, the civilian political group
in the North wanted General
Babangida to discontinue the
programme par tly because they
did not like any of the two
candidates and partly because
the Hausa-Fulani did not have a
candidate. This meant that the
whole programme could go to
blazes simply because it seemed
as though it would end without
someone they could control as
the country’s President. Leading
this group was the then Sultan of
Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki,
who from March 1993 argued that
neither Abiola nor Tofa could
represent the interest of the North.
Alhaji Dasuki made this known to
President Babangida immediately
after the National Convention
of the two political parties. He
continued this pressure in May
1993. He canvassed various views
on what the President should do if
he were to abandon the transition
programme. He specifically raised
this issue with me when I visited
him on May 19, 1993….But I
kept reminding him that it was
too late in the day to think of
a new agenda to which he kept

insisting that “my people” will
not buy any of the two candidates.
I kept promising him that the
June 12, 1993 Presidential election
would be free and fair and that
the purpose of my visit to Sokoto
was to preside over the training
workshop for domestic monitors
from Kebbi and Sokoto states. To
this he said, “Professor, you work
so hard for this country and for
your friend, the President, but this
may turn out to be a waste of your
time”….The Sultan felt so agitated
that he…recalled what Alhaji
Umaru Dikko, former Minister of
Transport and the Co-ordinator of
the Presidential election of Alhaji
Shehu Shagari had said during
the Second Republic. Dr. Dikko
pointedly argued against the
thought of Chief Abiola becoming
the Presidential candidate of the
National Party of Nigeria on the
grounds that the npn Presidential
candidacy was not for sale to the
highest bidder. I have gone this
far to buttress the difficulties
that later came from this source.
General Babangida overestimated
his ability with respect to what
the former Sultan could do at an
appropriate time. (pp. 76-77)
L————————————————

[Babangida & Omoruyi
discussion on 21 June 1993]
But he [Babangida] brought me
right back to the immediate
problem facing him. He agreed
with my account, but said that
he did not take his “boys” into
confidence and that he had
rejected the security briefs in the
face of the report which I gave
to him. He said that what he
told them was that he would be
able to stop Chief Abiola at the
appropriate time. I then asked:
“Do you think you have reached
that stage now?”
He said: “Yes and No”.
“It cannot be ‘Yes’ and ‘No’”, I
uttered and continued: “With
the greatest respect and with the
greatest sense of responsibility and
with the greatest sense of loyalty
to the President and love for the
country, it is late in the day”.
He was shocked by my statement.
Without giving a chance for
response, I went personal; and said,
“This is not the appropriate time;
we have passed that stage, Ibrahim.
I can see your problem but the
country will not take it.” While
he stared at me I went on: “You
cannot tell the country this.”
His countenance changed and he
said, “The country will just have
to take it,” he said. “I cannot kill
myself for the sake of what the
country wants. I am sorry,” he
lamented. It was astonishing
to hear a General state that he
could not lay down his life for his
country. But I understood what he
meant.