Business
will not, in practice, be zero’. That is,
corruption could not be completely
eradicated without also burning the
house down, although there should
be an equilibrium point between
anti-corruption and efficiency.
This is the realm of economics and
organisational studies, of course.
Going beyond Klitgaard’s normative
approach, however, the anti-corruption
idea shows more fundamental
issues. The problem with efforts to
curb malfeasance is apparent to the
initiated: if leaders – who are the ones
charged with the task of adopting
and carrying out anti-corruption
measures inside their organisations –
are already engaged in illegal acts, the
anti-corruption drive will not just stop
short of the maximum (as Klitgaard’s
tenet suggests), but will most likely
stop much earlier than that. How early?
Although the answer will change from
case to case, we can reasonably expect
the political will for integrity efforts to
cease when they begin to pose a threat
to the interests of the leadership.
But let us take a step back, before
moving on. Anti-corruption, just as
any other government activity, does not
only translate into costs. Considering it
affects society (we hope in a beneficial
way), it also creates benefits for the
government in the form of political
capital. This capital, when we drop the
assumption of a virtuous and devout
leadership, explains in theory the reason
certain policies are adopted while
others are ignored. Not surprisingly,
political capital is especially important
in democracies, where it can translate
directly into votes and power. Therefore,
Klitgaard’s notion (of anti-corruption
efforts being acceptable just providing
productivity can be maintained) could
be converted into a more realistic
statement: anti-corruption efforts are
pursued just only if they are politically
profitable for the leadership.
The ugly truth
Clearly, the obvious conflict between
approaches based on political capital
and political will is insurmountable
when we artificially leave aside the
crucial weight of agency and private
interests. To reconcile both positions,
it is necessary to accept that for an
honest government, anti-corruption
policies must only be attractive in
direct relation to the political capital
they can generate. Conversely, for a
corrupt government, anti-corruption
policies should be avoided in