Military Review English Edition September-October 2014 | Page 79

MACRO-ETHICS

and wanted the RVN [Republic of Vietnam,
the South, with its capital in Saigon] to cease
being obstructionist. To both sides Nixon was
saying that the United States remained strong
and willing to use forceful action even as it was
showing a readiness to compromise.25
It worked. Unlike previous bombing campaigns on
limited and highly restricted targets, which had little
effect on the North Vietnamese, Operation Linebacker
II compelled them to return to the talks and sign a
cease-fire.
One can view the earlier limited bombing campaigns
from a Cynefin Framework perspective as ineffective
probes. The expanded bombing can be considered another probe, which proved effective even when the bombing
involved morally dubious, but not prohibited, targeting.
The action had a morally acceptable strategic result:
peace talks. Whether the final peace agreement held for
more than a few years is moot. The reluctance of the
parties involved to adhere to their ends of the agreement
(nonaggression by the North and military support