Military Review English Edition September-October 2014 | Page 13

INSIGHT

Conclusion
Although mission command is commander centric
and commander driven, on examination it is easy to see
that NCOs at every level have a primary role in the
success of mission command. The mission command
philosophy, with its six principles, and the mission

command warfighting function, with its tasks and
systems, require significant NCO engagement. In fact, the
only way commanders will be able to exercise mission
command successfully is by having trained, educated, and
experienced NCOs at the forefront of operations.

Notes
1. Doctrine 2015 refers to a major reorganization of doctrinal publications, begun in 2011 and expected to be complete in 2015. The
purpose is to reduce their length and number, reduce development
time, and enhance collaboration and accessibility through technology.
2. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2012);
Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command
(Washington DC: U.S. GPO, 2012).
3. ADP 6-0, 1.
4. Ibid., 2.
5. ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, (Washington DC: U.S.
GPO, 2012), 3-2.

6. ADP 6-0, 11.
7. ADRP 6-2, 3-9.
8. Commander’s intent is defined as “a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end
state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and
helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the
commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the
operation does not unfold as planned.” Source: Joint Publication ( JP)
3-0, Joint Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 11 August 2011).
9. ADRP 6-0, 3-2.

MR We Recommend

Liberty Roads
Nicholas Aubin, Histoire & Collections Casemate, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2014,
220 pages, $55.00

T

he Red Ball Express Highway is the nickname given to the supply route
opened in August 1944 that stretched from the landing beaches to the
American armies launched in an incredible pursuit throughout France.
For three months, up to 6,000 trucks drove along this route. It symbolizes the opulence and power of American
logistics. However, the generals complain in their memoirs about the lack of gasoline, ammunition, and even warm
clothing and cigarettes. Patton thought that the rear echelon services led by General Lee had failed in their mission
and delayed the end of the war. It is this paradox that led to the writing of this book. The investigation is more
than just a detailed account of the campaign as seen from the rear; it is the first publication to cover in depth the
American logistical effort during the Second World War in Europe. —From the Publisher
MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2014

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