Military Review English Edition September-October 2014 | Page 128

Perhaps Mosier’s most significant revision is his
reevaluation of German Gen. Falkenhayn’s goal for
Verdun. He is remembered as wanting to “bleed France
white” at Verdun, but Mosier, a Falkenhayn apologist,
makes a good case for a more subtle goal. Falkenhayn
planned to take Verdun before French Gen. Joffre’s
anticipated summer 1916 summer offensive in order to break French morale. This could occur either
by piercing the line at Verdun, or by eliciting a sadly
typical French counter attack which could only lead to
staggering French casualties and failure. In either case,
the objective was to “Frankreichs Kräfte verbluten,”
i.e. to bleed France’s will and strength white. Though
Falkenhayn lacked an understanding of how the
French political system worked, this objective was far
less tactically bankrupt than is generally understood.
Though the 1916 offensive at Verdun did not
immediately break French morale, Mosier argues that
the battle led indirectly to the French army’s mutinies
of 1917. As Verdun’s position became increasingly
threatened, despite Petain’s effective defensive schemes,
the ever-fragile French government was threatened
with removal. It in turn threatened Joffre with removal. He in turn placed Gen. Nievelle in command of the
Verdun defense. Nievelle immediately launched the
bloody and futile infantry attacks Verdun is remembered for, which were heralded throughout France as
victories. Once Joffre was finally removed, Nievelle
was placed in command of the disastrous Champagne
offensives at Chemin des Dames in April 1917, which
prompted the mutinies.
Mosier offers an important corrective to the battle
of Verdun, reexamining the tactical significance of
various points, incorporating fighting in the near and
not-so-near vicinity of the forts, and directly attacking
mistakes that have grown up in the common perception of the battle. It is a must read for World War I
enthusiasts.
John E. Fahey, Ph.D. candidate, Purdue
University, West Lafayette, Indiana

126

BATTLE FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC: The
Strategic Naval Campaign that Won World War II in
Europe
John R. Bruning, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2013,
300 pages, $40.00

There are no flowers on sailor’s graves,
No lilies on the ocean waves,
The only tributes are seagull sweeps,
And the teardrops that his sweetheart weeps.
–Anonymous

ohn Bruning dedicates this book to the compelling sacrifices made by tens of thousands of
civilian merchant marine sailors who gave their
lives at sea in the Atlantic Ocean to win the war
in Europe. The losses taken by these civilians in World
War II are rarely acknowledged and it was satisfying to
see the honor paid to them. The author points out the
merchant mariners lost about 80,000 people in the war,
affirming that it may have been safer to join the U.S.
Marine Corps in World War II since the loss rate for
merchant mariners was higher than that of the
marines.
The book is a well-written chronological walkthrough the unfolding of the war in the North Atlantic.
It begins with the Kriegsmarine building up force
in 1939, and carries us through the war chapter by
chapter, highlighting some of the major turning points
that alter the course of the battle in the Atlantic. The
events covered extend across all levels of war to create
a compelling narrative. At the highest level he draws
attention to significant Allied events including the
meeting of Churchill and FDR to create the Atlantic
Charter, and strategic decisions like the commitment
of the United States and Britain to supply Stalin in his
war effort.
Operational-level details emerge too. The changes
to convoy operations are discussed as are the German
operation plans as they evolved to press for German
dominance of the Allied supply lines. The German navy’s Operation Drum Roll (aka “The Happy Time”) is
recounte