Military Review English Edition September-October 2014 | Page 121

BOOK REVIEWS

In reference to the above paragraph (and to play
on the book’s title), I believe “the lieutenant [clearly]
don’t know.” Clement has crafted a memoir which may
not be glamorous as some, but is highly readable and
informative. His angst that his volume may not appeal
to readers is clearly unfounded. Without question, this
is a volume which will be read and valued by many.
In the following years, this will be a book sought out
by those seeking an understanding the critical role of
logistics in the war in Afghanistan and how the combat
loggie adapted and met the incredible challenges the
war presented.
Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

GREAT POWERS, SMALL WARS:
Asymmetric Conflict Since 1945
Larisa Deriglazova, Woodrow Wilson Center Press/
Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington, D.C.,
2014, 408 pages, $60.00
reat Powers, Small Wars is a well-researched,
quantitative book that attempts to identify
basic characteristics and variables between
great powers and adversaries of lesser power to
determine why the stronger power is defeated in war.
The book utilizes various databases to determine the
characteristics and variables used in the conflicts. The
author provides two case studies: the dissolution of the
British Empire after World War II and the U.S. War in
Iraq, 2003-2011, to support her findings. The case study
on Iraq will conjure up many thoughts among U.S.
military professionals.
Deriglazova is an associate professor of history and
the chair of world politics at Tomsk State University
in Siberia as well as a member of the International
Relations Department and a former scholar in the
Kennan-Fulbright Scholarship program at the Wilson
Center in 2009. Deriglazova’s expertise lies in the field
of Russian and Eurasian studies.
The book focuses on systematically studying asymmetric conflicts using quantitative methods to explore
reoccurring elements found in such conflicts. The
underlying theme of the book is a critical analysis on
how great powers lose their power by having to come
to agreements with lesser powers on terms contrary to
MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2014

their interests at the start of conflicts. The findings are
not new, but the statistics associated with the findings are relevant. For example, between 1800-2003,
the stronger nation won these types of conflicts 71.5
percent of the time, between 1900-1949 the stronger
nation won 65.1 percent of the time, and from 19501999 the stronger nation won 48.8 percent of the time.
Statistics for the post-World War II period indicate
that the great powers were willing to engage in asymmetric conflicts—the United Kingdom engaged in 14
conflicts, China in 11, the Soviet Union in eight, and
the United States in 33—but the data also illustrate
the inability of the great powers to achieve their stated
goals and interest in over half the conflicts. Deriglazova
identifies seven factors for the difficulty great powers
had in achieving victory: loss of will by the great power,
fatigue or unwillingness to expend more resources to
achieve victory, inability to counter asymmetric tactics,
public opinion turns against the greater power, political
elections in the great power elect representatives who
are unwilling to pursue the conflict, interference from
outside or external nations or forces, and international
condemnation of the conflict.
The case studies are interesting and clearly articulate reasons why great powers have such great difficulty
in achieving their desired end states. Money or cost of
the war versus the benefit plays a significant role, as do
domestic politics, and international attention on the
war. The data provided by the author and the variables
studied are relevant to the book and the methodology
is sound.
The problem for great powers will continue to be
ways to achieve success in limited wars against unequal
opponents to achieve their national interest. This book
goes a long way toward identifying the problems associated with winning asymmetric conflicts, but it will be
up to military planners to discover doctrine and practices to win these asymmetric conflicts in the future.
Ken Miller, Platte City, Missouri

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