Military Review English Edition September-October 2014 | Page 117

BOOK REVIEWS

MACARTHUR’S WAR: The Flawed Genius Who
Challenged the American Political System
Bevin Alexander, Berkley Caliber, New York, 2014,
248 pages, $25.95

A

n accomplished military historian, Bevin
Alexander provides civil and military leaders another stark historical reminder of
the imperative of effective civil-military relations in
war. He provides a fair, balanced, and often critical
narrative of decisions and actions of two major antagonists, President Harry Truman and Gen. Douglas
MacArthur, before and during the Korean War.
Alexander provides three major themes that contributed to his designation of MacArthur as a “flawed
genius”: MacArthur’s larger than life ego; high-stakes
political infighting; and a near complete lack of situational understanding concerning Far Eastern affairs,
especially Chinese motives and intentions related to
Korea. Alexander’s narrative expertly weaves critical
connections between the themes, providing readers
with a keen insight of the rationale and necessity for
Truman’s relief of MacArthur as the U.S. senior commander of the Far Eastern Command.
The book’s opening paragraphs effectively establish
the decision-making dilemmas faced by U.S. civilian
and military leaders during past and present wars, and
the tenuous balance between civilian supremacy in
decision making and professional military expertise.
Although controversial civil-military relations are not
new topics in American military history, the relationship was severely tested on the Korean Peninsula in
1950 where problems were compounded by an international, political, and military environment where leader
decisions and actions were frequently wrong.
While MacArthur’s hubris is well documented, the
author reiterated his larger than life reputation as an
intellectual five-star general who exited World War II
as a hero of the Pacific theater. As a highly successful
military proconsul credited with the reconstruction
of post-war Japan, he was an imposing figure ostensibly well-suited for supreme military leadership in the
Far East at the outbreak of the Korean War. However,
along with his substantial credentials spanning five
decades came an unbearable ego, unbending support
MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2014

for the overthrown Nationalist Chinese government,
and an entrenched belief that World War III was not
a matter of if, but when, and anything short of total
victory, regardless of costs, in any war was anathema to
U.S. interests.
With this understanding of MacArthur, Alexander
effectively addressed the politics surrounding the
relations between Truman and the “flawed genius.” He
paints the Truman administration as one highly criticized by political opponents, that struggled mightily
to maintain international credibility, and was considered by most as neophytes of the geopolitical climate
in the Far East due to an unwavering focus on Europe
and the Soviet Union. These, combined with having to
deal with an ego-driven MacArthur with presidential
aspirations, made dealing with Korean affairs especially
contentious, and underscored the multi-faceted complexities faced by U.S. presidents during war.
Although often critical of Truman, Alexander
rightfully credits the president with a keen understanding of the realities and horrors of a potential nuclear
World War III, an understanding of the importance
of relationships within the United Nations and traditional allies, and the courage to recognize and act upon
MacArthur’s insubordinate activities and actions even
in the face of intense political fallout.
Treating all participants objectively, Alexander is
equally critical of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS) and
their approach to Far Eastern affairs, their total unpreparedness and surprise by the invasion of North Korea,
and their initial unwillingness to confront MacArthur’s
supreme persona, especially after Inchon’s success.
However, Alexander credits the JCS for finally standing
up to the realities of the “flawed genius” in congressional hearings, eventually swaying public opinion and
thwarting political intent to use MacArthur as a means
of denigrating the president.
Given the contentious relationship between
MacArthur and Truman, manifest in MacArthur’s
public statements causing consternation among
allies and blatant disregard for presidential orders,
Alexander provides overwhelming evidence as to why
MacArthur’s relief was essential. This book provides
readers with a valuable narrative of the variables that
placed an American president and an insubordinate
general on a colliding trajectory the outcome of which
affected the geopolitical landscape of the Far East and
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