Military Review English Edition September-October 2014 | Page 108

Figure 3.
Responsibility to Protect.28 Decision making under
this proposal might appear as figure 3.
It is within this space where I suggest that moral justification for state-sponsored unconventional
warfare emerges. Of note, understanding how and
when to determine moral justification for this type of
irregular warfare policy option still requires adherence to strict just war theory criteria to sustain this
validation and ultimately, legitimacy. The purpose
of the unconventional warfare operation must be
limited to defeating the military capabilities of the
oppressive state, not imposing new political systems.
After a political community rises from oppression
through achieving military victory, its struggle for
legitimacy is not complete, but it must build its own
sovereign political identity.
The intervening nation would find no moral basis
for pushing its own political agenda during this process.
Doing so delegitimizes the key element of independent
self-help and, consequently, places the legitimacy of the
entire effort in jeopardy.
Choosing to assist a resistance movement requires
a distinct decision-making process. Moral reasons
alone do not justify intervention. The culture of the
oppressed group and a practical assessment of its ability
(with assistance) to carry out its intent to become
independent must be considered. In addition, the
joint force must be prepared to help assess the group’s
military capabilities so senior defense leaders can make
informed recommendations to policy makers.
Opposing views. Critics might argue that a sixth
revision to the legalist paradigm is a convenient way
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to justify interventions meant only to achieve national interests—or even to mask their intent behind a
façade of morally just language. They might insist that
the proposed revision serves to justify preemptive
wars and forcible regime change. Opponents might
also say that the clandestine nature of unconventional
warfare makes it morally suspect from the outset.
My response to these arguments rests on the legalist
paradigm. Unconventional warfare is a means to
support what should be regarded as legitimate communities in their violent struggles against government
oppression and deliberate harm. The overarching moral
intent is to foster a better future environment and better peace for them, and possibly for us.
Additionally, unconventional warfare methods
emphasize economy of force with small special forces
operational detachments helping indigenous resistance
movements. In contrast, the larger scale of operations
to be conducted by conventional forces to support such
an undertaking would raise doubts about U.S. goals as
well as the legitimacy of the resistance movement. Any
resistance movement needs to struggle and achieve
its own ends—legitimacy and influence—rather than
having an outside military force do the fighting on its
behalf.
The initial campaign in Afghanistan in response
to the 9/11 attacks is an example of unconventional
warfare. This campaign enabled the Northern Alliance
to topple the Taliban government. It demonstrated the
effectiveness of conducting unconventional warfare
as an initial strategic offensive through the specialized
landpower capabilities of the U.S. military.
September-October 2014  MILITARY REVIEW