Military Review English Edition September-October 2014 | Page 103

The Morality of
Intervention by Waging
Irregular Warfare
Col. Daniel C. Hodne, U.S. Army
Col. Daniel C. Hodne, U.S. Army, serves in the U.S. Special Operations Command. He holds a B.S. from the U.S.
Military Academy, an M.A. from Louisiana State University, and an M.S.S. from the U.S. Army War College. His
assignments include tours with the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the Joint Staff.

U

nited States defense strategic guidance issued
in 2012 establishes defense priorities to
support U.S. security objectives.1 Among the
ten primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces, the
strategic guidance calls for capabilities to wage irregular warfare—defined as “a violent struggle among state
and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over
the relevant population(s).”2 While the United States
wages irregular warfare against enemies such as al-Qaida, policy options to achieve U.S. security goals may
entail projecting U.S. landpower among other nonstate
and state actors in volatile, complex, and ambiguous
environments.3
Depending on the context, coming to the aid of
nonstate actors, such as a group resisting oppression at
the hands of its government, may be deemed prudent
to advance, secure, or protect U.S. national interests.
Where committing conventional forces may not be
appropriate, policymakers still may decide to intervene
with sp V6