Military Review English Edition September-October 2014 | Page 88

successful. However, the Army must be careful to avoid
its previous mistakes of using social scientists for what
has been dubbed less than moral reasons by those in the
academic arena. Any attempt by the Army to co-opt or
use the work of social scientists for political
or military operational reasons may be seen
as another attempt to misuse or exploit them,
widening the existing chasm and ruining any
attempt we may try to close it.
Focusing efforts in this area has the
additional practical effect of providing a
strong fiduciary argument for the Army as we
compete for relevance against a tide of budget
cuts and fiscal constraints that can be expected to continue. More importantly, it provides
a conceptual framework for dealing with
the real world as it is evolving and the actual
threats we are likely to face in the foreseeable
future. Thus it must be taken seriously as the
help of experts from fields like psychology,
U.S. Army Capt. Steven Pyles speaks with local residents during a counter
anthropology, sociology, and other social
indirect fire patrol near Lalmah Village, Chapahar District, Nangarhar Province,
sciences promises real return on investment
Afghanistan, 1 September 2013.
which will stand up to outside criticism.
knowledge to the table. The same must be done with
In contrast, if the Army instead falls back—as it
experts and academics from the social science comtraditionally does—on relying upon ill-informed advice
munity. Inviting more psychologists, anthropologists,
from a regular list of current and former politicians,
primatologists, and others to Army conferences and fo- and continues to spend its money funding research
rums will add a great deal of information on the human contracts with crony for-profit think tanks and retired
aspects of strategy and warfare. Along with establishing officers turned lobbyists, the Army’s strategic landpowsuch a group of core social science advisors, the Army
er initiative will fail.
should conduct a human-domain-specific conference,
inviting academics from all the social science fields.
Conclusion
This forum might provide the Army with additional
The Army’s current lack of institutional commitknowledge on topics it missed or previously ignored.
ment to expanding its intellectual field of discussion is
In short, to actually accomplish the implied objecevident in its professional reading list. Only one book
tives of the strategic landpower strategy, we must begin
with a subject other than political or military theory
to build a network of contacts with key educators and
appears: Lt. Col. David Grossman’s On Killing.
specialists if we are serious about learning about the
The Army must promote expansion of its educahuman domain of warfare. We must look more totional frame of reference and adopt what biologist E.
ward institutions like the University of New Mexico’s
O. Wilson called his theory of consilience, the bringing
Evolutionary Psychology Department and less toward
together of all the different fields of study into one
the John F. Kennedy’s School of Government in our
great synthesis of knowledge.9
development of the human domain.
This includes exploring the relevance of previously
The same intimate relationship of trust that the
untapped resources in the academic world and fields
Army has with businesses, industry, and government
of study that may seem innocuous or unrelated but
entities must be built with the academic world of relatmay still add depth or breadth in unexpected ways.
ed social sciences if the human domain concept is to be
Similarly, we as an institution have to attempt to forge

U.S. Army National Guard 1st Lt. Chad Carlson, 129th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

Currently, the Army pulls a certain core group of
academics, scientists, business people, and theorists
for its policy and strategy discussions. They are trusted
confidants who collectively bring a broad wealth of

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September-October 2014  MILITARY REVIEW