Military Review English Edition September-October 2014 | Page 56

1973 and continued these over the necessary duration,
perhaps it could have enabled the FANK’s—and the
government’s—survival after the Paris Peace Accords.
However, the U.S. Congress progressively closed the aid
spigot that funded the ammunition and other supplies.
In December 1974, Congress enacted an effective
ceiling of $275 million on military aid for 1975, which
included $200 million in appropriated funds and
authority to use up to $75 million worth of materiel
already in Defense Department stocks. This represented about $75 million less than the previous year’s
program.18 By spring 1975, U.S. funding dried up; in
April the FANK succumbed as it used its last rounds
and flight hours in fighting the Khmer communists.
A bright spot for Cambodia was the Khmer
National Air Force. From its almost virtual destruction
on the ground by an NVA sapper attack in January
1971, the resurrected air force grew in competence and
capability until its demise in 1975.19 The U.S. Military
Equipment Delivery Team,
Cambodia, designed the force
structure of the Khmer National
Air Force mainly for counterinsurgency missions: close air support,
resupply, and command and control. With an operational strength
of 10,000 in January 1975, the
Khmer National Air Force had 131
aircraft, of which 101 were operationally ready. That month it flew a
remarkable 7,20 8 sorties, as compared to 5,134 sorties in January
1974. Its operational ready rate for
the T-28 aircraft was 79 percent,
compared to the U.S. Air Force
standard of 71 percent.20
Reports from the U.S. defense
attaché judged the caliber of the
A Cambodian soldier grimaces as he prepares to fire a rocket into a suspected Viet Cong
position in the Cambodian town of Saang, 23 April1970.
Cambodian pilots as quickly
approaching the skill level of their
The U.S. investment in Cambodia from 1970 to
Thai and South Vietnamese counterparts.21 When
1975 was unsuccessful for several reasons that includits end came on 17 April 1975, the Khmer National
ed poor policies and administration as well as termiAir Force was the last effective fighting force in
nating support when Cambodian forces were not yet
Cambodia, and its determined resistance contrasted
ready to defend their nation. If the United States had
sharply with the South Vietnamese air force’s alprovided adequately funded, staffed, designed, and
most total capitulation. Reasons for its effectiveness
administered U.S. military aid programs starting in
included good leadership and greater access to U.S.

AP Photo/Mark Godfrey/Nash

American embassy, the FANK still had not remedied
its fundamental logistical weaknesses.15 The army
remained road-bound because it had no ration system
and could not operate away from village markets.16
While its tactics had improved slightly, a proper supply
system still was lacking.
One example of this supply issue was ammunition.
The FANK fired about as much artillery ammunition as
the entire South Vietnamese army—which was at least
five times as large and was defending a much larger territory against an enemy that was better armed and several
times bigger than the Khmer Communist army. Even an
inexpert correspondent could see that the Cambodian
commanders habitually used firepower to compensate
for tactical and leadership deficiencies. As an official
assessment by U.S. officers in Phnom Penh early in 1975
stated, “The Khmer Armed Forces [FANK] depend on
firepower to win.”17 Yet, the FANK’s logistical system for
feeding this demand was inadequate.

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September-October 2014  MILITARY REVIEW