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NOTES 1. See . 2. Simon Keller, The Limits of Loyalty (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 31; James Connor, The Sociology of Loyalty (New York: Springer, 2007), 44, 69. 3. Leonard Wong, Thomas A. Kolditz, Raymond A. Millen, Terrence M. Potter, “Why They Fight: Combat Motivation in the Iraq War,” US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Initiative (Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2003). The Marshall quote is from page 2, and the authors’ argument is on page 19. 4. Walter J. Sowden and David L. Stewart, “The Dilemma of Competing Loyalties in the Profession of Arms,” Paper Submission: Fort Leavenworth Ethics Symposium “Applying the Military Ethic Across the Spectrum of Operations” (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7-10 November 2011), 19. 5. Sowden and Stewart, 3. The authors cite the following to support their claim: the Guantanamo Bay (Gitmo), Abu Ghraib (2003), Ltc. West (2003), Ltc. Sassaman/Samarra (2004), Pat Tilman (2004); Haditha (U.S. Marines in 2005), Bagram Airfield (2005), Hamdania (U.S. Marines in 2006), Mahmudiyah/Black Hearts (2006), Operation Iron Triangle (2006), Baghdad Canal Killings (2007), “Kill Team” (2010) incidents, and the rash of senior commanders (Army and Navy) being relieved over the past year (2011). 6. Inspector General, “Report of Investigation, Lt. Gen. Patrick J. O’Reilly, U.S. Army, Missile Defense Agency,” Alexandria, VA, 2 May 2012; Joe Gould, “Germanybased colonel relieved of duty,” Army Times, 6 March 2011, . 7. Walter F. Ulmer Jr., “Toxic Leadership: What Are We Talking About?” Army June (2012): 50. 8. Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (Simon and Schuster: New York, 2013), 190. Kaplan illustrates this point when he records that “[Maj. Gen. Peter] Chiarelli wasn’t the protesting or resigning type. He’d signed on to this assignment, to this war. He valued the Army’s hierarchy and its ethos of loyalty. He gnashed his teeth over Casey nearly every day, but always spoke up on his behalf and never–at least at the time–spoke out against him.” 9. Sowden and Stewart, 18. 10. Dan Ariely, The Upside of Irrationality: The Unexpected Benefits of Defying Logic (Harper Perennial: New York, 2010), 262. 11. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux: New York, 2011), 35. 12. Connor, 51. 13. Pauline M. Kaurin, “Identity, Loyalty and Combat Effectiveness: A Cautionary Tale,” JSCOPE (2006), 2, . 14. Michael O. Wheeler, “Loyalty, Honor, and the Modern Military,” Air University Review, May-June (1973): 4. 15. The Constitution of the United States. COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE FORT LEAVENWORTH,KANSAS New from the Combat Studies Institute CSI is proud to publish Georgii Isserson’s 1936 treatise, The Evolution of Operational Art, one of the founding works of Soviet Deep Battle theory, available for the first time in English. Translated by Bruce W. Menning, this work is the best example of the distillation of Soviet military thought before the Second World War. For the modern reader this book provides a historical example of a codified body of thought that enabled senior military commanders to visualize the aggregate effects of tactical engagements across time and space. For more information about CSI publications or assistance to your organization, contact the following at the Research and Publications Team: Dr. Donald P. Wright: [email protected] or Mr. Kendall D. Gott: [email protected] Visit our web site at: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/ 72 September-October 2013 ? MILITARY REVIEW