Military Review English Edition September-October 2013 | Page 70

efficacy rather than the moral good. They do not address humane treatment of the enemy and noncombatants, leaving military leaders and educators an incomplete tool box with which to deal with ‘real-world’ ethical problems. A professional ethics program addressing these situations would help equip them with a sharper moral compass for guidance in situations often riven with conflicting moral obligations.” 28. T.X. Hammes, for example, states: “Counterinsurgency is not a strategy but rather a range of possible ways in the ends, ways, and means formulation of strategy. Furthermore, population-centric counterinsurgency, as documented in Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency, is only one possible approach to counterinsurgency.” From “Counterinsurgency: Not a Strategy, but a Necessary Capability,” Joint Force Quarterly 65 (April 2012): 49. 29. Jim Frederick, Black Hearts: One Platoon’s Descent into Madness in Iraq’s Triangle of Death (New York: Random House, 2010), 323-24. 30. Paul Richter, “Rumsfeld Hasn’t Hit a Dead End in Forging Terms for Foe in Iraq,” Los Angeles Times, 30 November 2005. Rather than call insurgents what they were, Rumsfeld used such terms as “Former Regime Loyalists,” “Former Regime Elements,” “Anti-Iraq Forces,” “Deadenders,” and “Enemies of the Legitimate Iraqi Government.” He also denied there even was an insurgency. 31. Carl Levin, U.S. Senator Michigan, Senate Armed Services Committee, “Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody,” 2009, (16 November 2012), xvii-xxiv. 32. Douglas A. Pryer, The Fight for the High Ground: The U.S. Army and Interrogation During Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-April 2004 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College Foundation Press, 2009), 27, 54, 58-60. As described in these cited pages, key leaders and/or other personnel of at least four of the facilities most notorious for employing torture during the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom had previously attended Survival, Escape, Resistance, and Evasion (SERE) school. One interrogation chief had even been a SERE instructor. 33. Phillips, 58-62; Scott Ewing, “Discipline, Punishment, and Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (Special Edition, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic) (September 2010): 27-37. 34. Matthew Alexander, “I’m Still Tortured by What I Saw in Iraq,” The Washington Post, 30 November 2008, (22 April 2009). The interrogator Matthew Alexander is one of many who have testified to the recruitment boon that detainee abuse scandals provided anti-U.S. jihadist groups. During his in-brief at a special operations interrogation facility in Iraq, he was told that “the number one reason foreign fighters flocked there to fight were the abuses carried out at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.” 35. Hina Shamsi, “Command’s Responsibility: Detainee Deaths in U.S. Custody in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Human Rights First, edited by Deborah Pearlstein, February 2006, (16 February 2012), 1. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Phillips, None of Us Were Like This Before, 110-29. This chapter (“Crimes of Omission”) is a well-researched summary of both the inadequacies of U.S. military investigations into detainee abuse and the causes of these inadequacies. 39. Phillips, “Inside the Detainee Abuse Task Force,” The Nation, May 2011, 26-31, 26. 40. Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch, “By the Numbers: Findings of the Detainee Abuse and Accountability Project,” Human Rights First, 22 February 2006, (16 November 2012), 2. 41. Phillips, None of Us Were Like This Before, 50-67, 179-201; Tony Lagouranis and Allen Mikaelian, Fear Up Harsh: An Army Interrogator’s Dark Journey through Iraq (New York: New American Library, 2008), 57-140. Phillips describes waterboarding and other tortures at a facility run by an armor battalion that was never investigated for abuse. Tony Lagouranis describes abuse at a facility that was investigated and that an investigator confirmed as abusive of detainees. However, despite the investigator’s recommending punishment, no punishment was delivered, and when Lagouranis later interrogated at this facility, the abuse seems to have gotten even worse—abuse which subsequently went uninvestigated. See also Jim Frederick’s Black Hearts: One Platoon’s Descent into Madness in Iraq’s Triangle of Death (UK: Pan MacMillan, 2010),which describes abuses of both locals and detainees that went uninvestigated. Such evidence, while anecdotal rather than conclusive, indicates that publicized detainee abuse may have only been the tip of the iceberg of what actually occurred. 42. Office of the Surgeon Multinational Force-Iraq and Office of the Surgeon United States Army Medical Command, “Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) IV, Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07, Final Report,” Army Medicine, 7 November 2006, (3 June 2013). 43. Sara Wood, “Petraeus Urges Troops to Adhere to Ethical Standards,” U.S. Department of Defense News, 11 May 2007, (3 June 2013). 44. Office of the Surgeon Multinational Force-Iraq and Office of the Command Surgeon and