Military Review English Edition September-October 2013 | Page 31

H YB R I D T H R E AT

Engineer School is currently working to push the technology envelope by integrating Virtual Battlespace 2 scenarios and TBOC products into the Engineer Officer Basic and Captains Career Courses. As technology, TBOC, and other organizations like TBOC continue to evolve into the future, the U.S. Army may realize it is just scratching the surface for integrating technology into military education. What does the future hold? This question is a common one organizations and individuals regularly use for reflection to develop a shared vision for the future. The U.S. Army is no different when it contemplates what is the greatest threat to the Army Profession of 2020 and beyond. The current U.S. security environment is full of uncertainty and unpredictability, with no foreseeable shift in the future. Combating future adversaries will prove

to be the greatest threat to the Army Profession as warfare evolves into a more lethal and aggressive hybrid form. Defeating a hybrid threat and waging hybrid warfare will stretch and strain the U.S. Army Profession’s essential characteristics of military expertise, trust, and honorable service into a thinking man’s war. The experience of the IDF fighting Hezbollah in the 2006 Second Lebanon War serves as an ominous example of how hybrid warfare can test the fundamentals of a professional military. In a race to adapt smartly, the U.S. Army should transition to a learning organization full of warrior-scholars to ensure the vigilant employment of Landpower in the future. The vast possibilities of technology can also provide flexible options to challenge the future generation of U.S. Army Professionals in preparation for the next conflict. MR

NOTES
1 Martin E. Dempsey, Joint Education, White Paper (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, 2012), 3. 2 U.S. Army, Training Circular (TC) 7-100, Hybrid Threat (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 2010), 7. 3. Ibid., 15-16. 4. Moisés Naím, “The Five Wars of Globalization,” in International Security Studies Coursebook (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2012), 85. 5. Itai Brun, “The Second Lebanon War, 2006,” in A History of Air Warfare, edited by John Andreas Olsen, 297-324 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2010), 297. 6. Williamson Murray, “What the Past Suggests,” in Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present, edited by Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, 289-307 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 290. 7. William M. Arkin, Divining Victory: Airpower in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2007), 54. 8. Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and The Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, Monograph, U.S. Army War College, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 5. 9. Ibid., xi. 10. Ibid., 4. 11. Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 12-13. Pape describes one type of coercion as coercion by punishment. This form of coercion raises the costs or risks to the civilian population through direct attack by strategic bombing. Coercion by punishment also adjusts the costs by exploiting a civilian population’s sensitivity to large numbers of military casualties. In theory, exposure to constant pain and punishment will force an adversary to accept the coercer’s terms and make concessions. 12. Ibid., 12-13. 13. Biddle and Friedman, 49-50. 14. Ibid., 73. 15. Ibid., 50-51. 16. Brun, 302. 17. Biddle and Friedman, 52. 18. Brun, 312. 19. Ibid., 313-14. 20. Ibid., 314. 21. Collin S. Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2012), 259. 22. Murray, 290. 23. Cited in Peter R. Mansoor, “Hybrid Warfare in History,” in Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present, edited by Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, 1-17 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 13-14. 24. U.S. Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-90, Offense and Defense (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012), 39,64. 25. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger Publishers, 2006), 4. 26. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 186. 27. Murray, 293. 28. Karl Lowe, “Hybrid Warfare in Vietnam,” in Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present, edited by Williamson Murray and Peter R. Mansoor, 254-88 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 256. 29. U.S. Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, The Army (Washington, DC: GPO, 2012), 26. 30. Ibid., 26. 31. Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 63. 32. Mansoor, 7, 9. 33. Robert W. Cone, “Enduring Attributes of the Profession: Trust, Discipline, and Fitness” Military Review (September 2011): 5. 34. Matthews, 47. 35. Cited in Ibid., 47. 36. Brun, 315. 37. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 84. 38. Murray, 307. 39. TC 7-100, 32. 40. Ibid. 41. Defense Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Warning Terminology (Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2001), 5. 42. ADP 1, 26. 43. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 108. 44. Brun, 321. 45. Jack D. Kem, Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade. Monograph, U.S. Army Command General and Staff College (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combine ????
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