Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 84

I tell my audiences that it is like calculus—we are “the area
under the curve.” I am the product of all my bosses, bad and
good, all the training and education and all the assignments
and experiences.
—Gen. Colin Powell

T

here is no greater strength for a military than
having leaders capable of constructing strategies
to avoid conflict or, once committed, to win decisively. Although the military-industrial complex spends
billions each year to field
capabilities to maintain
Col. Michael R.
U.S. military dominance
Fenzel, U.S. Army,
relative to potential foes,
is the deputy commander (support) for
the 82nd Airborne
Col. Valery C.
Division. He most
Keaveny Jr., U.S.
recently served as the
Army, is the execchief of staff of the
utive officer for the
Army’s senior fellow at
Army G-8. He served
the Council on Foreign
as chief of staff of
Relations and, prior
the Army’s senior
to that, as chief of staff
fellow at the Center
for the 82nd Airborne
for New American
Division at Fort Bragg,
Security, as chief of
North Carolina. He
staff for the 101st
has commanded
Airborne Division
brigade combat teams
(Air Assault) at Fort
in the 82nd Airborne
Campbell, Kentucky,
Division and the 1st
and as commander of
Armored Division.
4th Brigade Combat
He holds a BA
Team, the 101st
from Johns Hopkins
Airborne Division
University, MAs from
(Air Assault). He
the U.S. Naval War
holds a BS in aviation
College and Harvard
management and
University, and a
flight technology
PhD from the Naval
from Florida Institute
Postgraduate School.
of Technology, an
He is the author of No
MMAS from the U.S.
Miracles: The Failure of
Army Command and
Soviet Decision-Making
General Staff College,
in the Afghan War
and an MSS from
(forthcoming from
the U. S. Army War
Stanford University
College.
Press).
82

the human element of conflict is where victory resides.
Determining what measures the Army can take to grow
our best tactical commanders into strong strategic leaders
demands a historical look at our country’s most gifted
examples. We argue that there are two underdeveloped
components in the strategic development of officers
the Army should consider revising if we are to cultivate
exceptional strategic talent in the future. First, there is a
range of career paths that will provide opportunities to
optimize the transition to strategic leadership. Second,
there are important adjustments to officer professional
education from captain through colonel worthy of enacting. These refinements will enhance the Army’s efforts
to build a wellspring of strategic acumen, especially when
coupled with exceptional potential. This potential is best
identified through differentiating leadership behaviors in
outstanding young officers, which will enable leaders to
narrow career path choices and broaden the number of
strategic opportunities available to our most promising
officers (see figure).
Good strategy explains what we are doing and why we
are doing it in clear terms. It binds the nation’s political
and military objectives with resources made available
from Congress, and it gives purpose to our tactical formations. Bad strategy muddles these things to the point
where they are of little use.1 At the heart of good strategy
are leaders who possess insight, experience, and a keen
understanding of the issues before them.
Most Americans would associate good strategy with
our campaign across Europe in World War II and the
success we enjoyed in Operation Desert Storm. In each
of these conflicts, great strategic leaders were at the helm.
Gen. George Marshall and Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower
in World War II, and Gen. Colin Powell and Gen.
Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. in Desert Storm were leaders
of uncommonly strong character, physical and emotional
resilience, and tremendous breadth of operational and
strategic experience. These leaders were well prepared
for the complexity they faced. When we think of the
type of strategic leaders who are prepared to lead our
military through crises in the future, few would disagree
that Marshall, Eisenhower, Schwarzkopf, and Powell are
models worthy of emulation.
World War II and Operation Desert Storm had clear
political and military objectives, and both included a
magnificent articulation of strategic detail. The future
operational environment is unlikely to afford that same
November-December 2016  MILITARY REVIEW