Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 81

LIMITED INTERVENTION

criteria in stabilization operations under
the constraint of available forces:
Be able to quickly deploy battle-hardened and well-trained troops.22
Do not refrain from deploying both
heavy and mobile means.
Be capable of reversing course.
Show restraint and discrimination
in the use of force while being able to
use force brutally if needed to establish credibility.
Be able to operate with frequent
effort shifts over long distances.
Be able to rapidly concentrate efforts
following intelligence to create a sense
of ubiquity.
Dedicate specialized resources to
monitor holes on the map.
Adapt the structure of the units
and their command continuously
to better match the requirements of
the mission.
Have units capable of operating
independently down to the reinforced
platoon level.
Implement a comprehensive approach down to lower levels.
Reform, train, and equip local forces
from the beginning of the operation,
and do not rely on them in the planning phase.
This article is adapted and translated from Rémy Hémez and Aline Leboeuf,
“Retours sur Sangaris: Entre Stabilisation
et Protection des Civils,” Focus Stratégique
67 (April 2016), accessed 23 August 2016,
http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/
files/atoms/files/fs67hemez_leboeuf.
pdf. Focus Stratégique is a publication
of the Institut Français des Relations
Internationales (French Institute of
International Relations, or Ifri). Maps are
from Ifri and the Centre de Doctrine d’Emploi des Forces (CDEF), used by permission.
The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not reflect those of the
French army.

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A DIFFERENT
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MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2016

R

émy Hémez recommends a comprehensive approach and
adaptability as the keys to successful limited interventions
while acknowledging that success is diffic ult to assess. Lessons
learned by French forces in the Central African Republic included
the need “to operate with frequent effort shifts over long distances” and to have “units capable of operating independently down
to the reinforced platoon level.” Operating over long distances
poses challenges for providing support to units.
In “The First Regionally Aligned Force: Lessons Learned and the
Way Ahead,” Military Review, July-August 2015, pages 84–93,
Capt. Cory R. Scharbo, U.S. Army, describes infrastructure
challenges the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry
Division, faced while operating in Africa from 2013–2014.
Scharbo’s unit conducted security cooperation and partnership efforts rather than combat operations, but like Hémez, he
attributes success to adaptability. Scharbo also finds that the U.S.
Army lacks objective, valid measures for assessing the success of
regionally aligned force missions.
For online access to Scharbo’s article, visit: http://usacac.army.mil/

CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20150831_
art016.pdf.

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