Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 77

LIMITED INTERVENTION

Operation Sangaris

Sudan

(January 2014–March 2014)

Effort in the west. Secure logistic route from Bouar to Bangui
Chad

Cameroon

South
Sudan

Main cities

Congo

Democratic Republic
of Congo

French military
presence
Bouar–Bangui
Axis of effort

(Graphic by Simon Fauret, French Institute of International Relations [Ifri])

Figure 2. Operation Sangaris, Second Phase
an advantage over the enemy and implement confidence-building measures (see figure 1).
Operations in the second phase, January to March
2014, focused on the west. A major objective was to
secure the CAR’s main supply road, from Bouar to
Bangui (see figure 2).
In the third phase, beginning March 2014, operations turned to the east. Forces sought to reestablish
government authority and to maintain a unified CAR
territory (see figure 3, next page).
This step-by-step approach, rendered necessary by
low troop levels, echoes the course of action implemented by French army Gen. Joseph Gallieni in Tonkin,
Vietnam, in the nineteenth century, known as the “oil
spot” concept.11 Faced with the refusal of his superiors
to grant him more men despite being ordered to secure a vast area stretching from Lao Kay to Dien Bien
Phu, Gallieni decided to proceed methodically and not
to change sectors until the one he held was secured.
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2016

Gallieni had opted for this course of action being fully
aware that it would take a significant amount of time.
Indeed, for a sector to be considered secure, economic
improvements would need to be visible and occupation
seen as definitive by the population.
However, in contrast to that distant inspiration, the
operational tempo in the CAR was much faster. Sangaris
had to maintain a high operational tempo to match political objectives and to stop massacres. As a result, areas
were never really secured, even after MINUSCA was
deployed in the wake of Sangaris.
The goal was to control only what was strictly necessary and to operate where the population was most at
risk while seeking to hand over control of each location
to international forces as soon as possible. In effect, tactical success was achieved by incessantly shifting efforts
at the operational level. This highlights the question of
the sustainability of military achievements. The triptych “Clear, Hold, Build” was not applied in its entirety
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