Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 66

Army personnel, are more than can be funded. Not all acquisition programs can continue in perpetuity if the Army plans to have resources for emerging threats and needs. The Way to Improve Army Acquisition The FY 16 NDAA included language in its Acquisition Policy and Management sections affecting two aspects of defense acquisition.16 First, it provided language reforming the CSA’s current acquisition responsibilities—changes that created some controversy between civilian acquisition leadership and the uniformed services’ leadership over the separation of duties established by the 1986 GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act.17 Second, it called for the service chiefs to review their authorities under Title 10, U.S. Code, and all subordinate acquisition statutes and regulations. They were to report to Congress in March 2016 on how their roles should be revised to improve overall acquisition responsiveness. Under the NDAA, defense acquisition’s goal is “to meet the needs of its customer in the most cost-effective manner practicable.”18 The law defines the “customer” as the military service having the primary responsibility for fielding newly acquired systems. Further, the customer is now represented by the respective service secretary and the military service chief. It is clear that these reforms will enhance the chiefs’ role in acquisition. However, the NDAA’s amendments are also littered with qualifiers such as “strongly consider,” “advise,” and “assist.”19 Nor did the FY 16 NDAA repeal Section 2546 of Title 10, which provides specifically for civilian management of the acquisition system. Rather, these reforms are really about influence—who gets more of it and who gets less. Additionally, these reforms shift the balance of influence within the system closer to the services—and their chiefs. However, they do not eliminate the OSD or service acquisition executive s or their authorities.20 The importance of influence should not be underestimated—especially when backed up by a congressional mandate and, perhaps more important, continued congressional interest. That influence could give the chiefs a louder, if not quite deafening, voice at a very crowded table. Accordingly, since the 64 chiefs were required to submit additional recommendations to Congress in March 2016, it was clear that Congress had not yet completed this round of acquisition reform—a fact that may further enhance the chiefs’ influence over time. Milley’s recommendations in March 2016 included establishing an Army Rapid Capabilities Office (ARCO), which would be similar to the Air Force’s rapid capability business model. The ARCO would increase his influence on critical R&D investments. A key objective would be to increase operational prototyping of promising technologies within a streamlined acquisition organization. Acquisition and Near-Term Capabilities Section 804 of the FY 16 NDAA, “Middle Tier of Acquisition for Rapid Prototyping and Rapid Fielding,” provides the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics the opportunity to shrink the bloated bureaucracy. According to Section 804, in coordination with the service chiefs and DOD comptroller, the undersecretary may establish middle-tier programs using an expedited process waiving the JCIDS and DODI 5000.02 requirements. These middle-tier programs must address near-term capability needs, i.e., they must be able to begin production within six months of program initiation and be completely fielded within five years. This streamlining for developing and fielding near-term capabilities is similar to the USSOCOM acquisition model, in which senior leadership’s priorities are executed within an environment that appropriately tailors an acquisition approach and then fully resources its needs. Precedent exists for the CSA to influence nearterm capability development and prioritization of needs through programs such as the Rapid Equipping Force, Asymmetric Warfare Group, and others. These rapid acquisition activities were mobilized to accelerate fielding equipment during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for urgent warfighter needs. While these ad hoc programs succeeded at meeting immediate operational needs, they were urgent workarounds to a cumbersome acquisition process that failed to respond to operational needs quickly. Acquisition’s underlying problems are exacerbated during conflict, when warfighters are in harm’s way. November-December 2016  MILITARY REVIEW