Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 66
Army personnel, are more than can be funded. Not
all acquisition programs can continue in perpetuity
if the Army plans to have resources for emerging
threats and needs.
The Way to Improve
Army Acquisition
The FY 16 NDAA included language in its
Acquisition Policy and Management sections affecting two aspects of defense acquisition.16 First, it
provided language reforming the CSA’s current acquisition responsibilities—changes that created some
controversy between civilian acquisition leadership
and the uniformed services’ leadership over the separation of duties established by the 1986 GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act.17
Second, it called for the service chiefs to review
their authorities under Title 10, U.S. Code, and all
subordinate acquisition statutes and regulations. They
were to report to Congress in March 2016 on how
their roles should be revised to improve overall acquisition responsiveness.
Under the NDAA, defense acquisition’s goal is “to
meet the needs of its customer in the most cost-effective manner practicable.”18 The law defines the “customer” as the military service having the primary responsibility for fielding newly acquired systems. Further, the
customer is now represented by the respective service
secretary and the military service chief.
It is clear that these reforms will enhance the chiefs’
role in acquisition. However, the NDAA’s amendments
are also littered with qualifiers such as “strongly consider,” “advise,” and “assist.”19 Nor did the FY 16 NDAA
repeal Section 2546 of Title 10, which provides specifically for civilian management of the acquisition system.
Rather, these reforms are really about influence—who
gets more of it and who gets less. Additionally, these
reforms shift the balance of influence within the system
closer to the services—and their chiefs. However, they
do not eliminate the OSD or service acquisition executive s or their authorities.20
The importance of influence should not be
underestimated—especially when backed up by a
congressional mandate and, perhaps more important, continued congressional interest. That influence
could give the chiefs a louder, if not quite deafening,
voice at a very crowded table. Accordingly, since the
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chiefs were required to submit additional recommendations to Congress in March 2016, it was clear
that Congress had not yet completed this round of
acquisition reform—a fact that may further enhance
the chiefs’ influence over time.
Milley’s recommendations in March 2016 included establishing an Army Rapid Capabilities Office
(ARCO), which would be similar to the Air Force’s
rapid capability business model. The ARCO would
increase his influence on critical R&D investments.
A key objective would be to increase operational prototyping of promising technologies within a streamlined acquisition organization.
Acquisition and
Near-Term Capabilities
Section 804 of the FY 16 NDAA, “Middle Tier of
Acquisition for Rapid Prototyping and Rapid Fielding,”
provides the undersecretary of defense for acquisition,
technology, and logistics the opportunity to shrink
the bloated bureaucracy. According to Section 804,
in coordination with the service chiefs and DOD
comptroller, the undersecretary may establish middle-tier programs using an expedited process waiving
the JCIDS and DODI 5000.02 requirements. These
middle-tier programs must address near-term capability needs, i.e., they must be able to begin production
within six months of program initiation and be completely fielded within five years. This streamlining for
developing and fielding near-term capabilities is similar
to the USSOCOM acquisition model, in which senior
leadership’s priorities are executed within an environment that appropriately tailors an acquisition approach
and then fully resources its needs.
Precedent exists for the CSA to influence nearterm capability development and prioritization of
needs through programs such as the Rapid Equipping
Force, Asymmetric Warfare Group, and others.
These rapid acquisition activities were mobilized to
accelerate fielding equipment during operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan for urgent warfighter needs.
While these ad hoc programs succeeded at meeting immediate operational needs, they were urgent
workarounds to a cumbersome acquisition process
that failed to respond to operational needs quickly.
Acquisition’s underlying problems are exacerbated
during conflict, when warfighters are in harm’s way.
November-December 2016 MILITARY REVIEW