Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 63

ARMY ACQUISITION

and near-peer conflicts.2 The outdated and inflexible
acquisition system is not adequate to meet the needs
of future force structure and engagement. Strategic
planning needs to integrate how the Army acquisition system will equip soldiers with technologies and
innovative solutions. This article discusses new business
practices that would enable the acquisition system to
field more near-term innovative capabilities faster and
support preparation for future operations.
Milley can improve the acquisition process using
existing authorities and targeted recommendations
to Congress on how to enhance the CSA’s role in acquisition. For instance, by exerting influence through
provisions in the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (the FY 16 NDAA), enacted
25 November 2015, the CSA can reshape the acquisition
enterprise to more effectively meet his stated objectives
of improving operational readiness, aligning Army modernization to future operations, and preparing soldiers to
operate in a variable global environment.3
Fortunately, Milley’s term as CSA coincides with
increasing congressional support for tweaking the
Army acquisition process to create a service provider/
customer business model. In his testimony at his 2015
nomination hearing, and in his recommendations to
Congress regarding the NDAA acquisition authorities
in March 2016, Milley acknowledged the opportunity
to increase his role in acquisition to meet the needs of
current and future land forces.4

The Opportunity to Improve
Army Acquisition
While an increase in the CSA’s influence on acquisition represents a positive change, more change is
needed. The media have reported widely on concerns
over the U.S. military’s seeming inability to meet
increasing global threats to U.S. security. Amid these
concerns, Congress has been calling for the military
service chiefs to have an increased role in Department
of Defense (DOD) acquisition to ensure their operational needs are aligned with the acquisition community’s priorities and investments.5
Policies such as Department of Defense
Instruction (DODI) 5000.02, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System; Army Regulation (AR) 70-1,
Army Acquisition Policy; and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01I, Joint Capabilities
MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2016

Integration Development System ( JCIDS), all allow for
rapid, flexible, and agile acquisition.6 Their policy guidance, however, is essentially undone by the
Army’s organizational culture. That culture lacks a
synchronized purpose and shared objectives; sustains
a multilayer bureaucracy that impedes acquisition
policy by overimplementing, overmanaging, and
overregulating; and tolerates entrenched organizational agendas.7
These organizational and cultural impediments
have an inhibiting effect on positive change and
reform. Instead of removing these impediments, and
moving toward eliminating centrist organizational
agendas and a burgeoning multilayer bureaucracy,
leaders are often incentivized to defend their turf, so
they request additional resources to cover the cost
of bureaucratic processes. In the absence of shared
Army goals, and in response to increasing oversight,
organizations default to this common mantra: “more
money, more people.” This situation illuminates why
culture change is needed—to focus on maximizing the flexibility of the acquisition system to meet
shared priorities and operational objectives.
The Army can improve how it conducts business.
It needs to identify and resolve the core problems and
obstacles within the acquisition system. Now that
the FY 16 NDAA has begun to address acquisition
Lt. Col. Rafael
Rodriguez, U.S. Army,
formerly served as a
Chief of Staff of the
Army fellow in the
Strategic Studies Group.
He holds a BS from the
U.S. Military Academy,
West Point, New York,
and a master’s degree
in defense analysis from
the Naval Postgraduate
School. He has served
in multiple airborne and
Special Forces command
and staff assignments,
where he deployed
routinely on overseas
contingency operations.

Maj. William H.
Shoemate, U.S. Army,
is an engineer. He formerly served as a Chief
of Staff of the Army
fellow in the Strategic
Studies Group. He holds
a BA from the University
of the Ozarks and an
MMAS from the U.S.
Army Command and
General Staff College. He
has served in a variety
of command and staff
assignments and was
an observer/controller/
trainer at the National
Training Center, Fort
Irwin, California.
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