Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 61

CONTRACT SUPPORT 3. GAO-13-212, Warfighter Report: DoD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], February 2013), accessed 30 August 2016, http:// www.gao.gov/assets/660/652052.pdf. 4. “2015 Africa Command Posture Statement,” U.S. Africa Command, 3 March 2015, accessed 30 August 2016, http://docs. house.gov/meetings/AP/AP02/20150303/103036/HHRG-114AP02-Wstate-RodriguezD-20150303.pdf. 5. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support. 6. Kevin M. Nash, “Setting the Theater from an Operational Contract Support Perspective” (unpublished manuscript, January 2016). Copy furnished courtesy of the author. 7. “Contracting,” Defense Information Systems Agency website, accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.disa.mil/mission-support/ contracting. 8. Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 (Army Logistics), G-4 Logistics Strategic Planning Guidance (Department of the Army, September 2015), 6–8, accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.army.mil/e2/c/ downloads/413303.pdf. 9. “Army Warfighting Challenges,” Army Capabilities Integration Center website, 14 June 2016, accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.arcic.army.mil/app_Documents/AWFC-Current.pdf. 10. “Army Guard and Reserve Restructuring Planned,” Department of Defense (DOD) news release, 10 December 1993, accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.ncfa.ncr.gov/sites/default/files/1.%20 OASD%20Press%20Release%20Offsite%20Agreement.pdf. 11. U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, “Sustainment AC/RC Mix,” PowerPoint presentation, Fort Lee, Virginia, 4 February 2016; Congressional Budget Office, Logistics Support for Deployed Military Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2005), 18, accessed 30 August 2016, https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/ files/109th-congress-2005-2006/reports/10-20-militarylogisticssupport.pdf; Frank Camm and Victoria Greenfield, How Should the Army Use Contractors on the Battlefield? Assessing Comparative Risk in Sourcing Decisions (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.rand.org/content/ dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG296.pdf; Tyrone C. Marshall Jr., “Army Reserve, Guard Leaders Caution against Sequestration,” DOD website 20 March 2015, accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/604316/ army-reserve-guard-leaders-caution-against-sequestration. 12. Joshua Klimas et al., Assessing the Army’s Active-Reserve Component Force Mix (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014), accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR417-1.html. 13. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, DOD, January 2012, accessed 30 August 2016, http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 14. Army 2020 and Beyond Sustainment White Paper (Fort Lee, VA: U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, 30 August 2013), 18, accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.cascom.army. mil/PDF/Army% 202020%20and%20beyond%20sustainment%20 white%20paper%20globally%20responsive%20sustainment.pdf. 15. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support, “Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility,” DOD report, October 2015, accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/.CENTCOM_reports. MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2016 html/5A_October2015_Final.pdf; Marcus Weisgerber, “Back to Iraq: US Military Contractors Return in Droves,” Defense One website, 23 February 2016, accessed 30 August 2016, http://www. defenseone.com/threats/2016/02/back-iraq-us-military-contractors-return-droves/126095/?oref=search_Back%20to%20Iraq:%20 US%20Military%20Contractors%20Return%20in%20Droves. 16. Statement of General Duncan J. McNabb, USAF, Commander, USTRANSCOM, Before the House Armed Services Committee on the State of Command, Washington, D.C., 17 March 2010, accessed 30 August 2016, http:// democrats-armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/ serve?File_id=0FD6F824-705A-4554-BA52-77EA233A32DC. 17. Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), SIGAR-16-2-SP: DOD’s Compressed Natural Gas Filling Station in Afghanistan: An Ill-Conceived $43 Million Project, SIGAR website, October 2015, accessed 30 August 2016, https:// www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-16-2-SP.pdf. 18. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 11 August 2011), III-42, accessed 30 August 2016, http:// www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf. 19. Michael Wright, “Commanding an Army Field Support Battalion,” Army Sustainment 44, no. 2 (March-April 2012), accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/MarApril12/ Commanding_Army_Field.html. 20. Matthieu Aikins, “The Bidding War: How a Young Afghan Military Contractor Became Spectacularly Rich,” New Yorker, 7 March 2016, accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.newyorker. com/magazine/2016/03/07/the-man-who-made-millions-off-theafghan-war; Dexter Filkens, “Convoy Guards in Afghanistan Face an Inquiry,” New York Times, 6 June 2010, accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/world/asia/07convoys. html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 21. DOD, Defense Contract Management Agency, “Theater Business Clearance/Contract Administration Delegation,” DOD Instruction DCMA-INST 139 with change 1, 20 March 2014, para. 1.2.1, accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.dcma.mil/policy/139/ DCMA-INST-139.pdf. 22. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, D-I. 23. Ibid., I-14 and I-15. 24. Ibid., chap. III. 25. Terri Moon Cronk, “DOD Likely Lessened Nepal Quake’s Effects, Official Says,” DOD News website, accessed 30 August 2016, http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle. aspx?id=128868. 26. Headquarters, United States Pacific Command, “Operational Contract Support (OCS) Response to 2015 Nepal Earthquake,” Joint Task Force 505 bullet background paper on Operation SAHAYOGI HAAT, undated. 27. Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Military Review 42, no. 12 (December 1962), 8-10, accessed 30 August 2016, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/ collection/p124201coll1/id/689/rec/5. 28. GAO-16-327, Army Planning: Comprehensive Risk Assessment Needed for Planned Changes to the Army’s Force Structure, (U.S. GAO, April 2016), accessed 30 August 2016, http://www.gao. gov/assets/680/676516.pdf. 29. Department of the Army, G-4, “USARCENT OCS Staff Assistance Visit Findings Report,” 28 August 2015. 59