Military Review English Edition November December 2016

from behind or directly beside their combat vehicles depicted little institutional change since the Soviet era. Framing the Problem The problem was further complicated by an overly bureaucratic tradition reminiscent of Soviet forces, with little support for change at higher echelons and narrowly defined roles across seventeen staff officers. The Ukrainian officers were accustomed to being taught what to think and not how to think. Communication flow originated almost exclusively from the top, with little bottom-up refinement or input. Under the Soviet model, maneuver battalions were units of execution instead of headquarters capable of detailed planning and complex decision making. This arrangement limited battalion commanders to only two or three decisions during a typical combat operation, in which most battalion actions consisted of battle drills. The restrictive command system greatly hindered the Ukrainian army’s response to the hybrid-warfare conditions of antiterrorism operations in 2014. Also exacerbating the situation were cultural norms and behaviors exemplified by leaders afraid to admit shortcomings or mistakes. This fear spiraled down to subordinates, as false reports of readiness were the norm, instead of truth and honest dialogue. Early in the training, one Ukrainian company commander stated outright that he would not tell his battalion commander of existing problems. Instead, he would opt to tell the U.S. PATT company commander, who would inform the U.S. PATT battalion commander, who in tu rn would advise his Ukrainian counterpart of the problem. Under such conditions, the creation of a battalion common operational picture becomes exCapt. Jacob Austin, U.S. Army, is the Headquarters and Maj. Ryan Riggin, Headquarters Company U.S. Army, served as commander for 3rd the battalion execBattalion, 15th Infantry utive officer for 3rd Regiment. He holds Battalion, 15th Infantry a BA from CarsonRegiment. He holds a Newman University BA from the University and an MS in orgaof South Carolina and nizational leadership a MBA from Liberty from Columbus State University. University. 46 tremely difficult, and an incomplete or inaccurate picture invites decisions based on faulty facts or assumptions. Consequently, Ukrainian staff officers typically asked the trainers for definitive solutions to tactical problems and struggled with the concept that well-analyzed mission variables and accurate staff estimates could influence mission success. To the Ukrainians, following the plan to the letter was more important than achieving mission success. This situation was analogous to how a Western army would view regulations. The Ukrainians regarded straying from a Ukrainian doctrinal template similarly to how U.S. Army soldiers would regard violating a regulation—a mindset that allows little creativity and flexibility in a complex operational environment. This same rigidness extends to the Ukrainian staff structure. Numerous majors and lieutenant colonels exist at the battalion level, but each is confined by a narrow scope of responsibility, thus limiting any staff officer’s influence on the commander’s decisions. Developing an Operational Approach for Training To effect organizational change, the PATT applied Army design methodology to frame the problem and the desired end state.3 The primary difficulty in transforming Ukrainian leaders from a centralized, control-oriented command style resided in proving the benefits of using staff analyses, empowering junior leaders, relying on results-oriented mission orders, and building mutual trust across the organization. The PATT’s Army design process led to the adoption of two learning methods to guide developing an operational approach to this problem: action learning and andragogy learning. The goal was to shape the Ukrainian battalion staff using adult-learner fundamentals in a group setting, in a manner that would make each individual willing to adopt new behaviors. Figure 1 illustrates how the PATT framed the problem during its design process. Developed by management expert Reg Revans in the late 1940s, action learning is a dynamic, team-oriented process useful for solving complex, real-world problems while teams simultaneously share experiences and lessons learned.4 Public- and private-sector organizations continue to use it as a way to improve operations. For example, human resource development professor Michael Marquardt describes General Electric’s success with action learning over about ten years, including November-December 2016 MILITARY REVIEW

Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 48