Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 45

COIN IN PAKISTAN

and order. The laws restricting their contribution are
outdated and should be updated to allow for a more expansive police role. In doing so, the police should recruit
and train officers from affected areas to maximize their
moral, practical, and tactical advantages. They should

also continue improving their performance through internal reform. The police’s role should be clearly defined
from the very onset of the COIN operations. Moreover,
the officers should be adequately trained and armed to
carry out their duties effectively and responsibly.

Notes
1. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 15 December 2006),
6-19. (This manual was superseded in May 2014 by FM 3-24,
Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies.)
2. C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, “The Police in Counterinsurgency Operations,” in Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents, eds. C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 1.
3. Shaukat Qadir, “The State’s Response to the Pakistani Taliban
Onslaught,” in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia:
Through a Peacebuilding Lens, ed. Moeed Yusuf (Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 149.
4. Christopher K. Butler and Scott Gates, “Asymmetry, Parity,
and (Civil) War: Can International Theories of Power Help Us
Understand Civil War?” International Interactions 35, no. 3 (2009):
330–40.
5. Huma Yusuf, “University Radicalization: Pakistan’s Next
Counterterrorism Challenge,” CTC Sentinel (February 2016): 4–8.
6. Joint Publication ( JP) 3-26, Counterterrorism (Washington,
DC: U.S. GPO, 24 October 2014), GL-3.
7. Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in
Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes
Since 1956 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), chaps.
8 and 11; Stahtis Kalyvis, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chap. 5.
8. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 22
November 2013), III-1. The defeat of an insurgency means a return
to normalcy—that is, recapture territory from insurgents, end their
use of violence, and govern that territory in accordance with the
rule of law.
9. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency:
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1966);
FM 3-24.
10. C. Christine Fair, “The Golden Temple: A Tale of Two
Sieges,” in Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces, eds. C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
11. C. Christine Fair, Urban Battlefields in South Asia: Lessons
Learned from Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2005); Prem Mahadevan, The Politics of Counterterrorism in India: Strategic Intelligence and National Security in
South Asia (London: I. B. Tauris & Company Ltd., 2012); Jugdep
Chima, “The Punjab Police and Counterinsurgency against Sikh
Militants in India: The Successful Convergence of Interests, Identities, and Institutions,” in Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents, eds. C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly (New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 258–90.

MILITARY REVIEW  November-December 2016

12. Adnan Naseemullah, “Police Capacity and Insurgency in
Pakistan,” in Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents, eds.
Fair and Ganguly, 189. Police corruption can be linked to poor
pay. According to Naseemullah, underinvestment in police salaries
carries “predictable [negative] effects on morale, police-society
relationships, and recruitment.”
13. Kamran Asdar Ali, “Pakistan’s Troubled ‘Paradise on
Earth,’” Middle East Research and Information Project, 29 April
2009, accessed 13 September 2016, http://www.merip.org/mero/
mero042909.
14. Afzal Shigri (inspector general of police [retired]), interview by Farhan Zahid, 10 February 2016, in Islamabad, Pakistan.
Shigri served as assistant superintendent of police in Charsada
and played a pivotal role in the counterinsurgency, which includes
Swat, Buner, Shangla, Swabi, and Dir districts of the Malakand
Division in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) Province.
15. These included Swat, Buner, Shangla, Swabi, and Dir districts of the Malakand Division in KPK Province.
16. C. Christine Fair, “Obama’s New ‘Af-Pak’ Strategy: Can
‘Clear, Hold, Build, Transfer’ Work?” The Afghanistan Papers 6 ( July
2010), 5, accessed 26 September 2016, https://www.cigionline.
org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_paper_6.pdf.
17. Noorwali Shah, “Charge-sheeted: ATC indicts
Sufi Muhammad in sedition case,” Express Tribune website, 8 February 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/834852/
charge-sheeted-atc-indicts-sufi-muhammad-in-sedition-case/.
18. Names withheld, Senior police officers of KPK Province,
interviews by Farhan Zahid, February 2016, in Peshawar, Pakistan.
19. “Policeman’s Beheaded Body Found in Peshawar,” Daily Times website, 3 April 2009, http://
archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/03-Apr-2009/
policeman-s-beheaded-body-found-in-peshawar.
20. Ali Hazrat Bacha, “Officer’s Beheading Raises the
Questions about Police Preparedness,” Dawn website,
17 October 2012, http://www.dawn.com/news/757312/
officers-beheading-raises-questions-about-police-preparedness.
21. Name withheld, Baluchistan police officer, interview by
Farhan Zahid, 20 February 2016, in Islamabad, Pakistan. The
reintroduction of Levies is linked to tribal patronage networks in
Baluchistan. While police forces are controlled by the Inspector
General of Police of Baluchistan Province, the Levies are beholden
to tribal networks and local politicians.
22. “BLA destroys Jinnah’s Residency in Ziarat,” Express Tribune
website, 16 June 2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/563877/
bla-destroys-jinnahs-residency-in-ziarat/; name withheld, senior
Baluchistan police officer, interview by Farhan Zahid, 20 February
2016, in Islamabad, Pakistan.

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