Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 44

Baluchistan
(2004–Present)
The police have played a minimal COIN role in Baluchistan. The
military operation ongoing since
2004 is managed by the Frontier
Corps, a paramilitary force commanded by Pakistan army officers.
Baluchistan has been divided into
“A” and “B” areas for administrative
and law enforcement purposes
since the British colonial period.
Paramilitary forces called the
Baluchistan Levies are responsible
for maintaining law and order in
the B area, which represents 95
percent of the province, whereas the police are limited to the
remaining A area.21 Most of the
insurgent-hit areas are in the B
area of the province and, hence, are
out of police jurisdiction.
The role of the police is not well
defined in the COIN operations
led by the paramilitary forces in
cooperation with the Pakistani
military. However, the police have
to deal with terrorist attacks committed by the Baluch separatists in
the urban centers of Baluchistan,
which are under police jurisdiction.
For example, when the insurgent
group Baluchistan Liberation
Army (BLA) burned down a
historic government building, the
Quaid-e-Azam Residency in the Ziarat district in June
2013, the local police investigated the case and traced
the individuals involved.22 The BLA insurgents were
later killed by the Frontier Corps in an operation outside of police jurisdiction.

Conclusion
The role of police in COIN in Pakistan is limited.
However, even though the police forces are better
trained and armed than before, the military authorities
seem uninterested in trusting the police with COIN
functions. There is no policing in over half of Pakistan’s
42

Training officers of the Special Security Unit exhibit their repelling
skills at the Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Elite Police Training School 30
November 2015 in Razzakabad, Karachi, Pakistan. (Photo by Farhan
Zahid)

territory, and those areas have become breeding
grounds for insurgents. The lack of initiative in reforming the police and increasing its role in COIN presents
a missed opportunity.
We believe that the COIN efforts in Baluchistan and
FATA would benefit from a greater role for police in
consolidating government control and maintaining law
November-December 2016  MILITARY REVIEW