Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 41

COIN IN PAKISTAN

may still be necessary for maintaining control and
Khalistan insurgency was a secessionist movement
keeping the insurgents from recapturing an area.
that sought an independent homeland for Sikhs in
Police forces recruited from local populations
India. The Indian Army’s attempt to rid the militants
offer the cultural and political advantages of govof a safe haven in the Golden Temple (a holy site)
ernance by people coethnic with the general popudestroyed the Temple, which delegitimized the Indian
lation. This
Army in the
Tajikistan
may provide
region.10 This
Gilgit-Balistan
legitimacy for
required
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
(KPK)
the governChina the Punjab
Abbottabad
Hashtnagar
ment and help
police to
Peshawar
Islamabad
Azad-Kashmir
counter the intake the lead
Afghanistan
surgents’ rhetoin COIN
Federally Administered
ric that frames
operations
Tribal Areas (FATA)
the conflict
that sought
in “us versus
to eliminate
Punjab
Ziarat
them” terms.
individual
Practically,
insurgents,
Pakistan
when the
though the
police recruit
Indian Army
Baluchistan
locally, this
and paramilIran
India
employment
itaries would
Sindh
opportunity
play the imKarachi
also provides
portant supan alternative
port roles of
to joining the
denying safe
insurgents
havens for
for those
Khalistanis
who might
in the coun(Graphic by Trevor Cloen, Skidmore College)
otherwise
tryside and
Pakistan
do so out of
along the
economic necessity or security concerns.
Pakistani border. After considerable investment in a
At a tactical level, coethnic and local recruitment
more capable force, the Punjab police were able not
provides intelligence advantages and enables the police
only to provide law and order in the cities but also
to target rebels individually. Local police can be betto conduct offensive operations against armed insurter than the military at gathering intelligence in areas
gents. They did so by leveraging their moral, practical,
where the military is seen as an outside force. Coethnic
and tactical advantages stemming from local Sikh and
police are better able to infiltrate insurgencies. Last,
Punjabi recruitment. Notably, the police recruited
if the police forces are competent at providing basic
new officers who could provide local intelligence, and
security and are capable of responding to civilian tips,
they infiltrated Khalistani and criminal organizations.
they can gather more intelligence from civilians about
Then, they used these advantages to fi nd and target
individual insurgents, which leads to more discriminate the insurgents.11
targeting. The police are, therefore, not only essential
Notwithstanding the clear advantages, using the
for providing law and order after the insurgency ends
police for COIN also risks drawbacks that should be
but they can also contribute to defeating insurgents
taken into account. There is a wide variation in the level
during the COIN campaign.
of professionalism within and across the police forces.
India’s experience in the state of Punjab during
In Pakistan, many police forces are corrupt or inadethe late 1980s and early 1990s bears this out. The
quately trained.12 Corruption hampers the rule of law,
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