Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 40

forces may suppress insurgents in some countries, but
“the task of restoring public order invariably involves
careful and sustained police work.”2 Yet, the police have
played a limited COIN role in Pakistan’s recent campaigns in the semiautonomous Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) and Baluchistan. An experienced
Pakistani military official described the police as “a
weak link in Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts.”3
Over half of Pakistan’s territory is not policed, which
facilitates not only the proliferation of terrorism but
also the graduation from terrorist organizations—characterized by clandestine groups using violence against
civilians—to more powerful insurgent organizations
that control territory and threaten the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the state.4
Drawing on e vidence from four case studies, we
argue that the police can and should play a larger
COIN function. The police are particularly useful for
consolidating a state’s legitimate authority through the
reestablishment of law and order in areas previously
contested or dominated by insurgents. Policing is also
a key to preventing terrorist acts in areas of limited
state authority from erupting in the first place, as well
as from turning into a full-fledged insurgency. Even
in areas where the state exercises considerable power,
terrorism may be a looming threat.5
Yelena Biberman is
an assistant professor
of political science at
Skidmore College and
nonresident fellow at
the Atlantic Council’s
South Asia Center. She
has a BA in international
relations from Wellesley
College, an MA in
regional studies from
Harvard University, and a
PhD (and MA) in political
science from Brown
University. Her research
focuses on unconventional warfare, militias,
and state outsourcing of
violence.
38

Philip Hultquist is
an assistant professor
of political science and
the director of the
International Studies
Program at Roosevelt
University. He has
an MA and a PhD in
political science from
the University of New
Mexico. His research
focuses on civil conflict and political party
systems.

Police in Counterterrorism
and Counterinsurgency
Counterterrorism (CT) is “activities and operations to neutralize terrorists and their organizations
and networks in order to render them incapable of
using violence to instill fear and coerce governments
or societies to achieve their goals.”6
Successful CT keeps terrorist organizations from
graduating to insurgent groups. While terrorism is
widely seen as a weapon of small, clandestine organizations, insurgent organizations tend to be better trained
and equipped to maintain control over territory.
Successful insurgents create an alternative government
structure, especially in semiungoverned areas where
the writ of state is weak.7
COIN’s scope is broader than that of CT. Per
Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency, COIN is
“the blend of comprehensive civilian and military
efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain
insurgency and address its root causes.”8 Insurgents
usually start their campaign as terrorists and subsequently gain territory, size, and influence. They
may continue to use terrorism as a tactic, especially
in government-controlled areas. In the areas under
their influence, insurgent groups often use symmetrical warfare. A successful COIN strategy recaptures
territory from insurgents, thereby downgrading them
to terrorists, which may result in increased use of
terrorism as a tactic.
Most experts argue that the police should be used
after the more heavily armed military establishes
some level of territorial control.9 The police
Farhan Zahid is a
are less capable than
superintendent of police
the military when it
and course commander
comes to defeating
at the National Police
insurgents in direct
Academy in Islamabad,
combat, but they have
Pakistan. He earned his
some moral, practical,
PhD in terrorism studand tactical advanies at Vrije University,
tages over militaries.
Brussels, Belgium, and
These can be leveraged
his publications focus on
to bring areas where
Islamist violent nonstate
the state exercises
actors in Pakistan, jihadi
some territorial conideologies, and the
trol back to normalcy.
Islamic State.
However, the military
November-December 2016  MILITARY REVIEW