Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 32

Number of determinate cases

exclusive) categories: political
75
goals, military goals, and economic goals. As figure 3 indicates, more than 60 percent of
seventy-five coercive attempts
65
have been driven by political
objectives, about 30 percent by
military objectives, and approximately 50 percent by economic
55
objectives. That the sum of
these three sets of objectives is
greater than 100 percent makes
clear that numerous coercers
45
have sought multiple, often
disparate objectives.
Moreover, in their coercive
attempts, challengers have also
35
been relatively successful on
their own terms and in comparison to their more powerful counterparts.40 Success
in this context is defined as
25
persuading a target to change
a previously articulated policy,
stopping or reversing an action
already undertaken, or dis15
bursing side payments, in line
with a challenger’s demands; in
other words, most of a challenger’s demands were met. A
5
case is coded as a “success” if
most or all of the challenger’s
known objectives were achieved
ca. 60%
ca. 30%
ca. 50%
and as a “partial success” if the
0
challenger achieved a signifPolitical
Military
Economic
icant fraction, but not all, of
N=75
determinate
cases
its aims. If few or none of the
Coercers’ objectives
challenger’s objectives were
(© Greenhill 2015)
achieved—or were achieved for
Figure 3. Distribution of Coercers’ Objectives
what appear to be exogenous
reasons—the case is coded as
a “failure.” Finally, a case is coded as “indeterminate”
the challenger’s demands were met. (Indeterminate
if the challenger achieved at least some of its objeccases are excluded from aggregate assessments of
tives, but causality is unclear; if there is insufficient
coercive success and failure.)
evidence to conclude that coercion was in the end
Overall, challengers have achieved at least some of
attempted; or if threats were issued, but a crisis never
their objectives about 74 percent of the time. If one immaterialized, and it remains unclear whether or not
poses a stricter measure of success and excludes partial
30

November-December 2016  MILITARY REVIEW