Military Review English Edition November December 2016 | Page 30

who tend to be reluctant to yield concessions and even
nations can sometimes structure emigration so that
to negotiate with weaker challengers absent crisis-genreceiving states are very likely to respond with inconsis25
erating incentives. As Thomas Schelling put it, “‘If I
tent administrative action,” which can then be used as a
say, ‘Row, or I’ll tip the
lever aga inst those who had
boat over and drown
“in effect brushed [them]
us both,’ you’ll say you
off ” previously.29
don’t believe me. But
Consequently, migraif I rock the boat so
tion crisis generation can
that it may tip over,
help enhance weak actors’
you’ll be more imcredibility, increase the
pressed … To make it
potency of their threats,
work, I must really put
and improve their coerthe boat in jeopardy;
cive capabilities in several
just saying that I may
different ways.30 For one
turn us both over is
thing, under certain condiunconvincing.”26
tions, migration crises may
Crisis generation
permit weak challengers to
offers relatively weak
inflict punishment upon
actors a tried-andtargets disproportionate
true strategy for both
to the costs of compliance.
overcoming powerful
Although targets may be
actors’ reluctance to
understandably reluctant
negotiate and leveling
to concede before an event
the playing field. It is
occurs, quite often demands
one of the few areas in
that were unacceptable at
which weak, and even
the outset may begin to
internationally illegitappear nominal compared
imate, actors may poswith the costs of managsess relative strength
ing sustained, large-scale
Mu’ammar Gaddhafi attends the 12th African Union Summit 2 Februvis-à-vis more poweroutflows into the indefinite
ary 2009 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Gaddhafi frequently threatened
ful target states, and
future, as the EU, like many
to use Libya as a conduit for massive illegal immigration into Europe
certainly—in the case
targets before it, is in the
as leverage for attaining policy goals. (Photo by Mass Communication
of migration crises—
Specialist 2nd Class Jesse B. Awalt, U.S. Navy)
process of discovering as of
also vis-à-vis their
this writing. Consider that,
27
even weaker domestic victims. After intentionally
unlike a bombing sortie, which may be profoundly
generating crises, weak actors can offer to make them
damaging but is perforce finite, a migration crisis can
disappear in exchange for military, financial, or political be, as noted above, “a gift that keeps on giving.”
payoffs. Indeed, international negotiators routinely reTherefore, not only are the reputational barriers to
port recognizable patterns of “drama and catastrophe”
resorting to such norms-violating tactics lower, but the
when dealing with particular international actors.28
bargaining advantages of doing so are also far greater.
In the face of such catastrophes, overlapping barIn addition, because in-kind retaliation is rarely an
gaining space may develop rapidly where before there
option for targets—and alternate responses may also
was none. Indeed, strong actors who were previously
be problematic—coercers using CEM may achieve a
unwilling to even talk to, much less negotiate with,
kind of escalation dominance over potential targets.31
their weaker counterparts will often abruptly temper
For instance, launching a war to counter outflows may
or reverse positions in the face of clear and present
be an option in certain circumstances, but often the
crises. As one migration scholar bluntly put it, “Sending expected costs associated with escalation to that level
28

November-December 2016  MILITARY REVIEW